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This dissertation includes two chapters. The first presents a new auction mech-
anism designed for conservation programs. Individuals compensated for con-
serving their land often extract substantial profits from the government or non-
governmental agency funding the conservation program. These rents limit the
amount of land which can be conserved, which decreases total surplus for society.
The new auction mechanism, the Provision Point Reverse Auction, was designed
to mitigate this rent-seeking behavior. This paper presents both theoretical and
experimental evidence to substantiate the efficacy of the mechanism.
The second chapter considers the effect that preference uncertainty may have
on two commonly observed behavioral anomalies: exchange asymmetries and the
willingness-to-accept/willingness-to-pay disparity. This paper provides both theo-
retical and experimental evidence which suggests that uncertainty in preferences
can explain at least part of these behavioral anomalies. The experiments rely on
chocolate and a “taste” treatment, where individuals in a treatment group are al-
lowed to taste a small amount of chocolate before making their trade or valuation
decisions.
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CHAPTER 1
PROVISION POINT REVERSE AUCTION
1.1 Abstract
Rent-seeking behavior by participants in payment for environmental services auc-
tions reduces the number of affordable contracts and decreases environmental pro-
tection. I propose a new auction mechanism, the provision point reverse auction
(PPRA), to mitigate this rent-seeking behavior. The PPRA includes a public
component where the probability of contract acceptance for one individual is af-
fected by the offers of others. I provide theoretical support for the new mechanism
which proves that optimal offering behavior in a PPRA results in less rent-seeking
from sellers than a multiunit reverse discriminative auction, even in contexts where
participants are risk neutral and place no utility on the welfare of their peers. I
follow this theoretical work with laboratory experiments comparing the PPRA to
the multiunit reverse discriminative auction and the reverse budget-constrained
auction. The experiments yield average offers between 12.57% to 58.17% smaller
in a PPRA compared to the alternate reverse discriminative auctions, with the
exact value dependent upon the compared mechanism and the target number of
contracts. The experimental results are also compared to the theoretical predic-
tions for a uniform price auction. I find that the PPRA is less expensive than the
uniform price auction, while the effect on social efficiency is dependent on parame-
ter values. If the goods being purchased are associated with positive externalities,
as we would expect in PES or conservation contexts, the reduction in rent-seeking
behavior can increase total surplus.
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1.2 Introduction
Payment for environmental services (PES) programs have become an increasingly
important component of conservation and environmental protection. Many of these
programs use reverse (or procurement) discriminative auctions to allocate contracts
to individuals who provide the environmental service [27]. Reverse discriminative
auctions involve one buyer and many sellers, where the winners of the auctions
receive their offer (or bid) as payment. In most reverse discriminative auctions,
the buyer has a fixed budget and accepts offers in ascending order until the budget
has been exhausted. In such an auction, sellers must balance potential gains in
expected profit from a higher offer against corresponding decreases in the proba-
bility the offer will be given a contract by the buyer. The higher the offer, the less
likely a contract will be won and the potential profit will be realized. If these auc-
tions are conducted for multiple rounds, sellers gain information about the costs
of their peers each round and use that information to increase their profits at the
expense of the buyer. More specifically, sellers slowly increase their offers until
they discover the offer at which they would no longer receive a contract. I call
submitting an offer above one’s value “rent-seeking offers” or simply rent-seeking
behavior.1 Over time, as rent-seeking behavior becomes more pronounced, the
buyer can afford fewer contracts and incurs a welfare loss. This is a particularly
significant problem for payment for environmental services or conservation pro-
grams because each contract may provide an environmental positive externality.
In such a case, a reduction in the number of contracts the buyer can purchase could
decrease the environmental benefits from the program and decrease social welfare.
1Much of the literature uses the term “bid-shading” instead of rent-seeking offers. This term
is not appropriate for reverse auctions, however, as “bid-shading” literally means to make a slight
reduction in a bid, while in reverse auctions, individuals seek to increase profits by increasing
their offers.
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Given the large number of PES or conservation programs which use reverse dis-
criminative auctions, including the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the
United States, the Auction for Landscape Recovery (ALR) in Australia, Challenge
Funding in Scotland, and others, rent-seeking behavior is likely decreasing social
welfare substantially.
With an eye toward mitigating rent-seeking behavior, and thus potentially in-
creasing social welfare in conservation and PES contexts, I designed the “provision
point reverse auction” (PPRA). The PPRA functions as a discriminative reverse
auction in that there is one buyer with many sellers and each individual with an
accepted offer receives their offer as payment. However, unlike other discriminative
procurement auctions, in a PPRA the buyer declares a requirement that a prespec-
ified number of offers must be affordable for any offers to be accepted. That is, if
the buyer cannot afford to purchase that prespecified number of offers, given their
budget constraint, then no contracts will be made with any individual.
Similar to a reverse discriminative auction, an individual participating in a
provision point reverse auction must weigh increases in potential profit from a
higher offer against corresponding decreases in the probability of realizing that
profit. As an individual’s offer becomes larger, it is also larger relative to the offers
of their peers which decreases the probability the offer will be given a contract by
the buyer. In a PPRA, however, a higher offer not only increases the offer relative
to its peers, it also reduces the chance that the buyer can afford the prespecified
number of units, which further lowers the probability of contract acceptance. I
prove that this additional requirement incentivizes participants in a PPRA to
submit offers closer to their costs, relative to a multiunit reverse discriminative
auction.
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The PPRA also includes a public component which serves as additional motiva-
tion for the mechanism. When an individual increases their offer, they negatively
affect the expected profit of the other individuals in the auction by reducing the
chance that any contracts are provided by the buyer. Thus, if individuals in a
PPRA place positive utility on higher profits for their peers, they will be further
incentivized to keep their offers close to their true costs. The author believes this
is particularly likely to be true in close-knit rural or developing communities where
PES programs are often implemented.
The PPRA would also make an attractive choice to governments or NGOs
when the organizations are faced with thresholds for environmental value. For
example, suppose a government agency is interested in restoring a polluted lake
and reintroducing several species of fish. The agency estimates that a pollution
reduction of X% would be required for the water to be habitable for the fish. If the
agency was to use a budget-constrained auction to pay neighboring individuals to
abate emissions, the agency would have no guarantee that the contracts necessary
for the reintroduction of the fish would be affordable. Since the primary goal of the
program is to reintroduce fish to the lake, the agency would be wasting their money
if the pollution abatement totaled less than X% of total pollution. If the agency
instead used a PPRA to pay individuals to reduce their emissions, the agency would
either achieve the pollution reduction necessary for the reintroduction of the fish
or keep their budget and attempt some other PES program. This hypothetical
situation is similar to a voluntary agreement between local New York farmers and
New York City over the Catskill-Delaware water system [1]. Instead of paying the
farmers to implement environmentally friendly practices, the city threatened that
if 15% of the farmers did not participate, costly regulation would take effect to
achieve the desired water quality improvement.
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This paper provides theoretical evidence which shows that, under various as-
sumptions, optimal offers under a PPRA are less than the optimal offers under a
multiunit reverse discriminative auction, given an opportunity cost. These theo-
retical predictions are supported by evidence from laboratory experiments. The
experimental work presented here abstracts away from the public component of
the mechanism to focus on proof of concept. Ten experimental sessions were con-
ducted with 240 student participants in total. The experimental results suggest
that the PPRA reduces accepted offers by between 21.55% to 58.17% or 12.57% to
21.59%, when compared to a multiunit reverse discriminative auction or a budget-
constrained multiunit reverse discriminative auction, respectively, with the exact
value dependent upon the target number of contracts. The effect on offering be-
havior is particularly pronounced for the lowest offers, which are also the offers of
greatest interest to the buyer.
1.3 Literature Review
Environmental goods or services are generally not exchanged on open markets and
so do not have an easily observable price. Auctions are a convenient method for
exchange when the values for a good are unknown, and thus present an attractive
choice to policy makers interested in purchasing environmental services. However,
there are many types of auctions and it is not a priori obvious which auction format
should be chosen, if an auction should be used at all. Vickrey’s seminal papers
on auction theory, and much of the literature that followed, relies upon a “single
independent private values” (SIPV) model [49, 50]. In the SIPV model: 1) there is
a single indivisible unit available for sale, 2) each bidder knows their own private
valuation, 3) all bidders are identical, 4) the valuations are independent and iden-
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tically distributed, and 5) all bidders are risk neutral [52]. Within this framework,
there are four formats: the Dutch auction, the English auction, the first-price
sealed bid auction, and the second-price sealed bid auction. The famous Revenue
Equivalence Theorem (RET) states that the auctioneer receives the same revenue,
regardless of the chosen format [35, 41, 49]. However, markets for environmental
services do not satisfy many of the assumptions required for the RET to hold, and
so we cannot apply this useful result to questions regarding conservation and PES
auctions.
One key difference between conservation and PES auctions and auctions in an
SIPV model is that auctions for environmental services are generally multiunit pro-
curement auctions. That is, conservation or PES auctions generally involve one
buyer purchasing multiple units of a good from multiple sellers. Unfortunately,
the literature is less developed on the topic of multiunit procurement auctions
than on other mechanisms, particularly for auctions where the buyer is restricted
by a budget [36, 5, 15, 27, 46]. Harris and Raviv (1981) and Cox et al. (1984)
generalized Vickrey’s original results and provided optimal offer functions for mul-
tiunit discriminative auctions with symmetric, risk neutral sellers whose costs are
drawn from a uniform distribution [17, 10]. Hailu et al. (2005) extended this
research and provided the optimal offer function for the reverse (or procurement)
multiunit discriminative auction, which they call a “target-constrained” (as op-
posed to budget-constrained) auction [15]. To the best of my knowledge, no one
has specified an optimal offer function for a multiunit procurement auction where
the buyer is constrained by a budget. Without more robust theoretical guidance
from the literature, researchers and policy makers are forced to rely on experience
and experimental evidence when making their decisions about how to purchase
environmental services.
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When using auctions in payment for environmental services (PES) programs,
buyers frequently opt for either a uniform second price auction or a discriminative
auction [27]. In a uniform second price procurement auction, all individuals who
submit winning offers are paid the first rejected offer. In settings where each seller
has only one unit of the good to sell, individuals have the incentive to offer their
true cost to the seller because increasing one’s offer cannot increase their own
payoff. In a discriminative procurement auction, individuals who submit winning
offers receive their offers as payment, analogous to a first price auction. Unlike
the uniform second price procurement auction, in the discriminative procurement
auction the optimal offering strategy is to submit an offer higher than one’s true
cost. Because only individual sellers have full information on their true costs, this
offering behavior leads to information rents for the sellers.
There is disagreement in the literature about the relative cost effectiveness of
the uniform second price and discriminative auctions from the perspective of the
buyer [8, 14, 6]. Each mechanism’s efficiency and cost effectiveness is a function
of the cost structure of the individual participants and the assumptions regarding
information and communication. In their comprehensive review on the theoretical
and empirical literature regarding conservation contracts, Latacz-Lohmann and
Schilizzi provided several reasons that explain why funding agencies often choose
discriminative procurement auctions over uniform price auctions. [27] First, uni-
form procurement auctions are riskier for sellers as both the probability of accep-
tance and the payoff are uncertain. This could lead to fewer participants in the
auction, which may decrease competition and increase offers. Second, individuals
with low costs would gain the most from the auction. This may be viewed as
unfair by many higher cost individuals. Third, uniform price auctions are more
complicated than discriminative procurement auctions, and thus may lead to poor
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offering strategies or lower participation levels.
Posted offer or flat-rate offer systems have been proposed as an alternative to
auctions in conservation and payment for environmental services settings. In these
programs, the buyer offers all individuals a fixed payment for participation in a
program which provides an environmental or conservation service for the buyer.
However, in a posted offer market, the price must be determined ex ante. In situa-
tions where there is uncertainty regarding the costs and benefits of the good to be
provided (a particularly large issue in environmental economics), auction mecha-
nisms increase efficiency by resulting in a market-clearing price. Latacz-Lohmann
and Van der Hamsvoort, in their paper on auction theory and conservation con-
tracts, show that “auctions are generally superior to a posted-price offer system
for providing low-cost solutions to the provision of environmental benefits, because
they introduce an element of competition between farmers” [28]. Other authors
have expanded upon this by demonstrating that posted offer systems result in more
contracts than discriminative procurement auctions, but that individuals who re-
ceive contracts in a posted-offer system are far less likely to fulfill the terms of the
agreement than individuals participating in an auction. For example, in an exper-
iment for tree-planting contracts, Jack finds that while 99.5% of the posted-offers
were accepted, those who received contracts were, on average, far more likely to
keep their trees alive [20].
To increase the efficiency of PES or conservation programs which use discrim-
inative auction formats, I propose the provision point reverse auction (PPRA).
The PPRA functions as a discriminative procurement auction with the added re-
quirement that a certain number of units are purchased by the buyer, given a
constant, exogenous budget. For example, if the provision point requirement is
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80% participation, but the buyer can only afford contracts for 75% of the sellers,
then no contracts will be offered and the buyer will keep their money. Section 1.4
will provide further details.
The PPRA is connected to the research conducted on the provision point mech-
anism (PPM) for voluntary contributions to public goods [11, 33, 43, 42]. In a pro-
vision point mechanism, a public good is provided only if the total contributions
exceed some predetermined threshold. If the total contributions do not exceed
this “provision point,” then all contributions are refunded to the participants and
no amount of the public good is provided. The PPRA is essentially the reverse
auction form of the provision point mechanism: instead of a total contribution
requirement, the sum of the lowest cost offers must be less than the budget and
the potential profits from the auction can be viewed as the public good offered
through the mechanism.
The closest paper to the provision point reverse auction, as formulated here,
is a contingent valuation study which attempted to reduce the upward bias in
willingness to accept estimates using a provision point. Their mechanism is called a
provision point mechanism (PPM), after the previous literature on contributions to
public goods [7]. This paper expands upon the work of Bush et al. by generalizing
their mechanism to an auction with many possible provision point requirements
and tests the auction mechanism with real money in an experimental setting. This
paper additionally provides theoretical support to substantiate the experimental
evidence.
Some related research has focused on conditional subsidies to individuals in set-
tings with voluntary contributions to public goods. More specifically, additional
subsidies can be paid out to farmers in a conservation or payment for environmen-
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tal services program if a certain amount of service is provided. For example, Le
Coent, Preget, and Thoyer find that a mechanism which provides a subsidy condi-
tional on some threshold being met improves both the efficiency and the efficacy
of the mechanism [29]. A second paper shows that a similar “conditional collective
bonus” can improve farmer participation and increase total land enrollment in a
payment for environmental services setting, while simultaneously decreasing costs
[26]. This is a potentially fruitful extension of the provision point reverse auction.
The PPRA provides contracts conditional on a certain amount of environmental
or conservation service being affordable. This could be stacked with a “condi-
tional bonus” paid to individuals who receive contracts when the provision point
requirement is met.
Much of the recent literature on conservation auctions has focused on special
features of the conservation and payment for environmental services settings which
create complications when deciding upon an optimal auction mechanism. The
focus of this paper, however, is on “proof of concept” for the mechanism, and so
abstracts away from many of these issues. A short examination of some of these
problems, however, provides useful insights into both how this mechanism might
perform in more externally valid settings and potential future areas of research.
For example, environmental or conservation benefits are often a function of the
spatial location of the conserved land; conserved land which is more compact will
provide better habitats for many species. This is a particularly important issue
for the construction of “wildlife corridors” [44]. Ideally, auctions in settings which
include this spatial component would select contracts based on a “total environ-
mental value” function which incorporates this spatial component. If auctions do
not use such a function, they are likely to under-procure environmental or con-
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servation value. The spatial nature of the problem, however, creates substantial
computational difficulties. For example, even in a setting with only 24 possible
plots of land to conserve, there are over 16 million possible combinations of land
to consider. With 30 plots of land, this set of possible combinations increases to 1
billion sets of land, and to over 1 trillion possible sets of land with 40 plots of land.
This computational complexity makes it difficult for auctions in spatial settings
to run in real time, or even over extended periods of time, and so many scholars
have devised alternative solutions which do not consider the spatial element of
conservation or environmental value, but which attempt to incentivize individuals
to conserve their land in clusters [37, 51, 2]. Given that the provision point reverse
auction will likely work best in settings with environmental thresholds, correctly
specifying the environmental benefits function is critical. As a result, combining a
provision point with a spatial auction presents a fruitful area for future research.
Another complication for conservation auctions is the availability of public
information on historical auction results. Messer et al. (2017) examine the effect
of public information provided by the buyer on seller behavior in reserve auctions
which trade in environmental services [34]. The authors find that the sellers use
this public information to increase rents. Further, they find that auctions with
variable budgets are more likely to lead to efficient outcomes. This complicates
the already difficult theory behind budget-constrained auctions. Given that the
budget selection is critical for the success of the provision point reverse auction, the
performance of the mechanism when the budget is random or changes randomly
overtime is another fruitful area for future research, particularly if a random budget
can increase the efficiency of the PPRA.
Finally, scholars have shown that the probability an individual will follow
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through on a contract is a function of the mechanism choice by the buyer [20, 21].
This is important for the provision point reverse auction as well, particularly if
the provision point requirement is set at an environmentally important thresh-
old. For example, suppose that the provision point requirement is set so that just
enough pollution reduction will occur to allow fish to return to a local lake. If a
non-trivial portion of the individuals contracted to reduce pollution do not respect
their contracts, then the government will spend money and fail to reduce pollution
sufficiently to achieve their goal of reintroducing fish to the lake. This problem can
be mitigated if the percentage of individuals who will break their contracts can be
estimated. However, the lab is not an appropriate setting for such analysis, and
field experiments would likely be required. The problem may also be mitigated by
a threat from the government. For example, when New York City was negotiating
with farmers around the Catskill-Delaware to reduce pollution, they threatened
to implement costly regulations on the farmers if an insufficient number of them
agreed to participate in the voluntary pollution abatement program [1].
1.4 Theory and Model
The theory section is split into two parts. In the first subsection, I re-derive the
symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium optimal offer function for a multiunit re-
verse discriminative auction and demonstrate several properties of that optimal
offer function. The second subsection introduces the provision point reverse auc-
tion, characterizes its expected profit function, and derives predictions for optimal
behavior in a PPRA compared to a multiunit reverse discriminative auction.
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1.4.1 Multiunit Reverse Discriminative Optimal Offer
Function
Let n ∈ N denote the number of participants in an auction. In a multiunit reverse
discriminative auction, the buyer is interested in purchasing p ∈ N units of a
good from the n sellers. This paper refers to p as the “target” of the auction.
Further, let B ∈ (0,∞) denote the budget if the auction is a budget-constrained
multiunit auction, vi ∈ [0, 1] denote individual i’s opportunity cost or value, oi ∈
[0,∞) denote their offer, Oj(vj) denote the assumed offering behavior of the other
participants as a function of their values, and O−1j (oj) denote its inverse. To
simplify the theory and computations, this paper makes the common assumption
that all values are drawn from a standard uniform distribution. All of the auctions
considered have the following properties:
1) More than one unit is being exchanged in each round;
2) The auctions have one buyer with multiple sellers. These auctions are known
as reverse (or procurement) auctions;
3) Values (opportunity costs) are independently drawn, so an individual’s value
provides no information about the values of the other participants;
4) Each bidder knows their own value but they do not know the value of any
other participant;
5) All participants, as well as the units they are trying to sell, are symmetrical
and indistinguishable;
In addition, this paper also assumes all participants are risk neutral.
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Much of the following theory relies upon order statistics, so a brief set of defini-
tions is in order. (See Wolfstetter (1996) for a brief and exceedingly useful overview
of order statistics and auction theory.) Out of a set of n draws from a distribution
with probability density function f(x) and cumulative distribution function F (x),
the random variable V(r), which represents the rth lowest draw, is called the rth
order statistic. The probability density function of V(r) is given by
fV(r)(x) =
n!
(r − 1)!(n− 1)!F (x)
r−1(1− F (x))n−rf(x) (1.1)
For a standard uniform distribution, f(x) = 1 and F (x) = x, so that the above
simplifies to
fV(r)(x) =
n!
(r − 1)!(n− 1)!x
r−1(1− x)n−r (1.2)
Notice that this is a beta distribution, B(r, n+ 1− r).
The auction formats considered have expected profit functions given by:
E[Π] = (oi − vi)× Pr(oi ∈ O) (1.3)
where O is the set of accepted contracts. The form of Pr(oi ∈ O) depends on the
auction used, as well as the parameter values chosen. As an individual increases
their offer, potential profit, given by (oi − vi), increases, but Pr(oi ∈ O), the
probability of realizing the potential profit, decreases. Thus, picking the optimal
offer for a given value requires balancing these two effects.
For the multiunit reverse discriminative auction auction, expected profit is
given by:
E[Π] = (oi − vi)× Pr(oi < O(p)) (1.4)
where O(p) is the pth lowest offer submitted by the other participants. From (1.2)
above and assuming that all values are drawn from a standard uniform distribution,
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the probability that an individual’s offer is one of the p smallest offers is given by
the function:
g(n, p,O−1j (oi)) =
(n− 1)!
(p− 1)!(n− p− 1)!
∫ 1
O−1j (oi)
up−1(1− u)n−p−1du (1.5)
Intuitively, the g function takes in an individual’s offer, oi, and transforms it into
an opportunity cost through O−1j (·). O−1j (oi) denotes the opportunity cost draw
that would result in the offer oi from the other participants in the auction, assum-
ing the common offering behavior Oj(·). This opportunity cost can then be used
to calculate the probability the offer is one of the p smallest offers using the prop-
erties of order statistics and the given distribution for opportunity costs. From
this point on, g(n, p,O−1j (oi)) will be simplified as g(O−1j (oi)).
Given an expected profit function, we are interested in the offer which, for each
possible value, maximizes expected profit. That is, we are interested in a function
which takes in an individual’s opportunity cost and returns their expected profit
maximizing offer. Even more, we are interested in the offer function which is also
a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. A symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium
occurs when the best response to a given offer function is that offer function. More
specifically, a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium is an optimal offer function
where, if an individual is participating in an auction where they assume the other
individuals submit offers according to an offer function Oj(vj), the optimal re-
sponse is to also submit offers according to Oj(vj).
Hailu, Schilizzi and Thoyer derive the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for
a multiunit reverse auction. [15] A re-derivation and confirmation of their results
is included in the appendix. (Propositions 1 and 2 are expansions upon Hailu et
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al’s results.) In a multiunit reverse auction (also known as a target-constrained
auction), a participant in the auction is interested in the probability that their offer
will be one of the p lowest offers out of the n offers submitted by the n participants.
The symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for a multiunit procurement auction is:
O∗i,TC(vi) =
∫ 1
vi
up(1− u)n−p−1du∫ 1
vi
up−1(1− u)n−p−1du (1.6)
The optimal offer function, O∗i,TC(vi), takes in an individual’s value and returns
the optimal offer (i.e., the offer which maximizes expected profit) for that value.
Figure 1.1 displays this optimal offer function, assuming n = 8 and p = 5 or p = 3,
where it can be clearly seen that low-value individuals can extract substantial rents
(equivalent to many times their opportunity costs) from the buyer. Intuitively, for
lower opportunity costs, an individual can increase their offer above their opportu-
nity cost to increase potential profits while only slightly decreasing the probability
that their offer will receive a contract. On the other hand, when a high oppor-
tunity cost individual submits an offer higher than their opportunity cost, they
have a small chance that their offer will be accepted. As a result, the optimal
offer function converges to cost revealing offers as an individual’s opportunity cost
approaches 1.
Note that O∗i,TC(vi) is not defined when vi = 1. Despite this, we can still make
the following claim.
Proposition 1. As vi approaches 1, O∗i,TC(vi) converges to 1.
Proof. For all vi ∈ (0, 1), the numerator of O∗i,TC(vi) is less than the denominator,
so O∗i,TC(vi) is bounded above by 1 for vi ∈ (0, 1). Further, given that a non-
negative expected profit requires O∗i,TC(vi) ≥ vi, O∗i,TC(vi) is bounded below by vi.
Both y = vi and y = 1 converge to 1 as vi approaches 1, so O∗i,TC(vi) converges to
1 as vi approaches 1 by the sandwich theorem. 
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Figure 1.1: Target-Constrained Auction: n = 8, p = 5
It is also informative (and will be useful in future proofs) to show that O∗i,TC(vi)
is a strictly increasing function in vi. But first, the following proposition and proof
are made simpler by rewriting O∗i,TC(vi) with the regularized beta function, given
by:
Ix(a, b) =
∫ x
0 t
a−1(1− t)b−1dt
B(a, b)
To rewrite O∗i,TC(vi) in terms of the regularized beta function, we multiply the nu-
merator and denominator of O∗i,TC(vi) by
B(p+1,n−p)
B(p+1,n−p) , where B(p+1, n−p) represents
the beta function with parameters p+ 1 and n− p. This yields
O∗i,TC(vi) =
∫ 1
vi
up(1− u)n−p−1du× B(p+1,n−p)
B(p+1,n−p)∫ 1
vi
up−1(1− u)n−p−1du× B(p,n−p)
B(p,n−p)
= 1− Ivi(p+ 1, n− p)1− Ivi(p, n− p)
× B(p+ 1, n− p)
B(p, n− p)
(1.7)
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Given that B(x, y) = Γ(x)Γ(y)Γ(x+y) , (1.7) simplifies to
O∗i,TC(vi) =
1− Ivi(p+ 1, n− p)
1− Ivi(p, n− p)
× p
n
(1.8)
One convenient property of the regularized beta is that
Ivi(p+ 1, n− p) = Ivi(p, n− p)−
vpi (1− vi)n−p−1
pB(p, n− p) (1.9)
and thus (1.8) can be rewritten as:
O∗i,TC(vi) =
1− Ivi(p, n− p) + v
p
i (1−vi)n−p−1
pB(p,n−p)
1− Ivi(p, n− p)
× p
n
= p
n
+ v
p
i (1− vi)n−p−1
nB(p, n− p)(1− Ivi(p, n− p))
(1.10)
Having rewritten O∗i,TC(vi) as above, we can describe the first derivative of the
optimal offer function.
Proposition 2. O∗i,TC(vi) is a strictly increasing function of vi for vi ∈ [0, 1) .
Proof. Applying the quotient rule, the derivative of O∗i,TC(vi) with respect to vi is
∂O∗i,TC(vi)
∂vi
=
[
((pvp−1i (1− vi)n−p−1 + (n− p− 1)(1− vi)n−p−2vpi )×
(nB(p, n− p)(1− Ivi(p, n− p))) + nvpi (1− vi)n−p−1vp−1i (1− vi)n−p−1)
]
/
n2B(p, n− p)2(1− Ivi(p, n− p))2
(1.11)
Factoring out vp−1i and (1−vi)n−2p−2, and dividing the numerator and denominator
by n yields
∂O∗i,TC(vi)
∂vi
=
vp−1i (1− vi)n−2p−2((1− vi)p(p− nvi + vi)B(p, n− p)(1− Ivi(p, n− p)) + (1− vi)nvpi )
nB(p, n− p)2(1− Ivi(p, n− p))2
(1.12)
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We want to show that
0 < v
p−1
i (1− vi)n−2p−2((1− vi)p(p− nvi + vi)B(p, n− p)(1− Ivi(p, n− p)) + (1− vi)nvpi )
nB(p, n− p)2(1− Ivi(p, n− p))2
(1.13)
for all vi ∈ (0, 1). Note that vp−1i (1−vi)n−2p−2 and pB(p, n−p)2(1−Ivi(p, n−p))2 are
both positive, and thus both can be cancelled out without affecting the direction
of the inequality. Inequality (1.13) thus holds when
− (1− vi)p(p− nvi + vi)B(p, n− p)(1− Ivi(p, n− p)) < (1− vi)nvpi (1.14)
Dividing both sides by n(1− vi)pB(p, n− p)(1− Ivi(p, n− p)) yields
−
(
p
n
− vi + vi
n
)
<
(1− vi)n−pvpi
nB(p, n− p)(1− Ivi(p, n− p))
(1.15)
A slight rearrangement of terms yields
vi
(
1− 1
n
)
<
p
n
+ (1− vi)
n−pvpi
nB(p, n− p)(1− Ivi(p, n− p))
(1.16)
Notice that the righthand side of (1.16) is the optimal offer function for O∗i,TC(vi)
from (1.10). Also note that (1− 1
n
) < 1. Equation (1.16) thus implies (1.17) below.
vi
(
1− 1
n
)
< vi < O
∗
i,TC(vi) (1.17)
Given that profit maximization requires O∗i,TC(vi) > vi for all vi ∈ [0, 1), the
optimal offer function is increasing for all vi ∈ [0, 1). 
This proposition will prove critical when comparing optimal offering behav-
ior between the multiunit reverse discriminative auction and the provision point
reverse auction.
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1.4.2 Provision Point Reverse Auction
The provision point reverse auction is a discriminative reverse auction with the
added requirement that p of the n total offers must be affordable for any contracts
to be made, given the exogenous budget B. I call this additional requirement the
“provision point requirement.” In a PPRA, an individual has to consider several
factors when choosing their offer. Like most discriminative auctions, the individual
must weigh the increase in potential profit from a higher offer against the decreased
probability that a given offer will be accepted. In a PPRA, a higher offer decreases
the probability of contract acceptance through two avenues. First, a higher offer
makes it less likely that the offer will be one of the p lowest offers, and thus less
likely that the offer will receive one of the p possible contracts. Second, a higher
offer decreases the probability that the provision point requirement will be met,
and thus reduces the probability that any contracts will be provided.
The provision point requirement can be viewed as an “average” reservation
price. In reverse auctions, a reservation price is the highest acceptable offer a seller
can make to the buyer. By setting the budget and the provision point, the buyer
implies that they will not spend more than B/p, on average, for the p units. The
average reservation price allows individuals with opportunity costs higher than the
average reservation price to receive a contract by incentivizing lower opportunity
cost individuals to submit lower offers. For example, in a PPRA, an individual
can submit a bid higher than B/p and still receive a contract if at least one of the
other p lowest offers is less than B/p, while this is not possible in an auction with
a reservation price of B/p.
Looking back to (3), in a PPRA, the probability that an offer, oi, receives a
contract is the probability that oi is one of the p lowest offers times the probability
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that the provision point requirement is met given that oi is one of the p lowest
offers. If either the provision point requirement is not met or oi is not one of the p
lowest offers, then oi will not receive a contract. Thus, the expected profit function
for an individual participating in a PPRA is given by
E[Π] = (oi − vi)× Pr(oi < O(p))× Pr
( p−1∑
j=1
O(j) + oi ≤ B|oi < O(p)
)
(1.18)
where the third term on the right-hand side is the probability that the provision
point requirement is met, given that oi is one of the p lowest offers.
When considering the probability the provision point requirement will be met,
an individual is interested in the expected value of the excess budget, given the
sum of the expected offers of the other low cost individuals. That is, the individual
is interested in the difference between the budget and what they expect the sum
of the other p − 1 lowest bids to be. If their offer is one of the p lowest and is
greater than the excess budget, the provision point requirement will not be met
because the sum of the p lowest offers will exceed the budget. On the other hand,
if their offer is one of the p lowest and is less than the excess budget, the provision
point requirement will be met as the sum of the p lowest offers will be less than
the budget. If we assume that the other individuals submit offers according to a
common offer function, Oj(·), and we assume the budget, B, is given exogenously,
then the expected value of the excess budget given that oi is one of the p lowest
offers, denoted by Θ, is
E[Θ] = B −
p−1∑
j=1
E[Oj(v(j))|oi < o(p)] (1.19)
where v(j) is the jth lowest opportunity cost. Intuitively, the expected value of the
excess budget tells an individual the expected offer which, on average, would just
meet the provision point requirement. The variance in the distribution of the excess
budget suggests the degree to which the probability the provision point requirement
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will be met changes with small changes in an individual’s offer. Gupta and Sobel
(1958) show that the sum of standard uniform order statistics is asymptotically
normal. Thus, if the assumed offering behavior, Oj(vj), is cost-revealing, then this
distribution would be asymptotically normal. However, because individuals will
not submit cost-revealing offers, we cannot use this approximation. In fact, given
that the offer function for other individuals will generally not have a closed form,
it seems unlikely that a closed form representation of (1.19) exists.
To summarize, an individual’s probability of submitting one of the p lowest
offers, given their offer and assumed offering behavior of other individuals, is de-
scribed by (1.5). Given the individual submits one of the p lowest offers, the
probability that the provision point requirement is met is given by the probability
that oi is less than the excess budget, with the expected value of the excess budget
given in (1.19).
Before we proceed further, we require the following axiom which is suggested
by Proposition 1.
Axiom 1. If the probability that an individual receives a contract is 0 in any auc-
tion, then their optimal offering behavior is to submit an offer at their opportunity
cost.
This axiom is important because it defines optimal offering behavior for values
for which the optimal offer function might not be defined. For example, the optimal
offer function for the multiunit reverse discriminative auction (see (1.6)) is not
defined when vi = 1. A natural conclusion from this fact is that the optimal
offer for individuals with vi = 1 is 1 in both the multiunit reverse discriminative
auction and the provision point reverse auction. With this background, I provide
the following proposition.
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Proposition 3. Suppose O∗i,TC(vi|n, p) is the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium optimal offer function for the multiunit reverse discriminative auction with
a target of p < n and O∗i,PP (vi|n, p,B) is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium
optimal offer function for the provision point reverse auction with a provision point
requirement of p < n and a budget of B. (From this point on, O∗i,TC(vi|n, p) and
O∗i,PP (vi|n, p,B) will be simplified as O∗i,TC(vi) and O∗i,PP (vi), respectively.) Addi-
tionally, assume Axiom 1 holds. Then O∗i,TC(vi) = O∗i,PP (vi) if and only if either i)
any single participant in the auction cannot affect the probability that the provision
point requirement is met by increasing or decreasing their offer or ii) vi = 1.
Proof. The expected profit function for the multiunit reverse discriminative auction
is given by (2). Let g(n, p, oi) represent the probability that an offer is one of the
p lowest and let o∗i,TC represent the optimal offer, given vi, in a multiunit reverse
discriminative auction. Note that g(n, p, oi) is a decreasing function in oi; the larger
oi, the less likely it is one of the p lowest offers. Expected profit for the multiunit
reverse discriminative auction is maximized where the first order conditions are
met:
(o∗i,TC − vi) =
−g(n, p, o∗i,TC)(
∂g(n, p, o∗i,TC)
∂o∗i,TC
) (1.20)
Let w(n, p,B, oi) represent the probability that the provision point requirement
will be met and let o∗i,PP represent the optimal offer, given vi, in a provision point
reverse auction. Note that w(n, p,B, oi) is a non-increasing function of oi; as a
given offer gets larger, the likelihood that the provision point requirement is met
does not increase. Then the first order condition for profit maximization for the
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PPRA is:
(o∗i,PP−vi) =
−g(n, p, o∗i,PP )× w(n, p,B, o∗i,PP )(
∂g(n, p, o∗i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
× w(n, p,B, o∗i,PP ) +
∂w(n, p,B, o∗i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
× g(n, p, o∗i,PP )
)
(1.21)
Suppose O∗i,TC(vi) = O∗i,PP (vi). Then o∗i,TC = o∗i,PP for all vi. Multiplying the
top and bottom of the right-hand side of (1.21) by the reciprocal of its numerator
yields
(o∗i,PP−vi) =
−1(
∂g(n, p, o∗i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
× 1
g(n, p, o∗i,PP )
+
∂w(n, p,B, o∗i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
× 1
w(n, p,B, oi,PP ∗)
)
(1.22)
From (1.20), and given that o∗i,TC = o∗i,PP , we have
(o∗i,PP − vi) =
−1( −1
(o∗i,PP − vi)
+
∂w(n, p,B, o∗i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
× 1
w(n, p,B, oi,PP ∗)
) (1.23)
Multiplying both sides by the denominator of the right-hand side yields
(o∗i,PP−vi)×
( −1
(o∗i,PP − vi)
+
∂w(n, p,B, o∗i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
× 1
w(n, p,B, oi,PP ∗)
)
= −1 (1.24)
which simplifies to
0 = (o∗i,PP − vi)×
(
∂w(n, p,B, o∗i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
× 1
w(n, p,B, oi,PP ∗)
)
(1.25)
Equation (1.25) implies that either o∗i,PP = vi or
∂w(n, p,B, o∗i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
= 0. Given
that o∗i,TC = vi only when vi = 1, the two optimal offer functions can be the
same only when each participant cannot affect the probability the provision point
requirement is met by changing their offer or vi = 1.
To prove the other direction, suppose that no individual can affect the proba-
bility that the provision point requirement is met by changing their offer. Then,
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by definition,
∂w(n, p,B, o∗i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
= 0 and, using (1.21)
(o∗i,PP − vi) =
−g(n, p, o∗i,PP )× w(n, p,B, o∗i,PP )(
∂g(n, p, o∗i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
× w(n, p,B, o∗i,PP ) + 0 ∗ g(n, p, o∗i,PP )
) (1.26)
Simplifying (1.26) provides
(o∗i,PP − vi) =
−g(n, p, o∗i,PP )(
∂g(n, p, o∗i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
) (1.27)
which is the first order condition for the multiunit reverse discriminative auction.
If instead of assuming that no individual can affect the probability the provision
point requirement is met we assume that vi = 1, the result follows immediately
from Axiom 1. 
This proposition provides our first theoretical prediction: when the parameters
of a PPRA are such that no single participant can affect the probability that the
provision point requirement is met, the optimal offer function for all participants
in the auction is the optimal offer function for a multiunit reverse discriminative
auction. Proposition 4 expands upon Proposition 3.
Proposition 4. Suppose O∗i,TC(vi) is the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium
optimal offer function for the multiunit reverse discriminative auction with a target
of p < n and O∗i,PP (vi) is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium optimal offer
function for the provision point reverse auction with a provision point requirement
of p < n and a budget of B. Further suppose that O∗i,TC(vi) is convex in vi.2
If a participant in the auction can impact the probability that the provision point
requirement is met, then O∗i,TC(vi) > O∗i,PP (vi) for all vi.
2The convexity assumption holds for every set of parameter values I have tested.
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Proof. Equations (1.20) and (1.21) provide the first order conditions for the optimal
offer for an individual competing in a multiunit reverse discriminative auction and a
provision point reverse auction, respectively. Note that g(n, p, o∗i ) and w(n, p,B, o∗i )
are decreasing and non-increasing in o∗i , respectively, so that both
∂g(n, p, o∗i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
and
∂w(n, p,B, o∗i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
are less than or equal to zero. We prove by contradiction.
Suppose that o∗i,TC ≤ o∗i,PP . Then, combining (1.22) and (1.20), we have:
−1(
∂g(n, p, o∗i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
× 1
g(n, p, o∗i,PP )
+
∂w(n, p,B, o∗i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
× 1
w(n, p,B, oi,PP ∗)
) >
−g(n, p, o∗i,TC)(
∂g(n, p, o∗i,TC)
∂o∗i,TC
)
(1.28)
Note that both sides of the inequality are positive. Thus, multiplying both sides
of the inequality by their reciprocal does not reverse the inequality. The resulting
rearrangement is given by
−
(
∂g(n, p, o∗i,TC)
∂o∗i,TC
)
× 1
g(n, p, o∗i,TC)
>(
−∂g(n, p, o
∗
i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
× 1
g(n, p, o∗i,PP )
− ∂w(n, p,B, o
∗
i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
× 1
w(n, p,B, oi,PP ∗)
)
(1.29)
Given our assumptions about w(n, p,B, oi,PP ) and g(n, p, oi,PP ), we know that
− ∂w(n, p,B, o
∗
i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
× 1
w(n, p,B, oi,PP ∗)
≥ 0 (1.30)
and
− ∂g(n, p, o
∗
i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
× 1
g(n, p, o∗i,PP )
≥ 0 (1.31)
Returning to (1.29), if the sum of (1.30) and (1.31) is less than the left-hand side
of (1.29), then we know that (1.31) is also less than the left-hand side of (1.29).
− ∂g(n, p, o
∗
i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
× 1
g(n, p, o∗i,PP )
< −
(
∂g(n, p, o∗i,TC)
∂o∗i,TC
)
× 1
g(n, p, o∗i,TC)
(1.32)
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which further implies that
− g(n, p, o
∗
i,PP )(
∂g(n, p, o∗i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
) > − g(n, p, o∗i,TC)(
∂g(n, p, o∗i,TC)
∂o∗i,TC
) (1.33)
The completion of this proof requires a lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose O∗i,TC(vi) is the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium optimal
offer function for the multiunit reverse discriminative auction with a target of p <
n. Additionally, suppose that O∗i,TC(vi) is a convex function. Then the difference
between a given optimal offer, o∗i,TC, and its corresponding value, vi, is a decreasing
function in vi.
Proof. Equation (1.20) provides the first order condition for the optimal offer,
given a value vi, in a multiunit reverse discriminative auction. The left-hand side
of (1.20) provides the difference between an optimal offer and its corresponding
value. Taking a derivative with respect to vi on both sides yields
∂O∗i,TC(vi)
∂vi
− 1 = ∂
−g(n, p, o∗i,TC)(∂g(n,p,o∗i,TC)
∂o∗i,TC
)
 /∂vi (1.34)
Proposition 2 states that O∗i,TC(vi) is an increasing function, and the convexity
assumption implies that the second derivative of O∗i,TC(vi) is positive over the
range [0,1) as well. If
∂O∗i,TC(vi)
∂vi
was greater than 1 for any vi in this range, then
∂O∗i,TC(vj)
∂vi
would also have to be greater than 1, for any vj > vi, by convexity.
Recall that O∗i,TC(vi) is bounded below by the 45 degree line and that O∗i,TC(vi)
converges to 1 as vi converges to 1, by Proposition 1. If the derivative of O∗i,TC(vi)
was ever greater than 1, then O∗i,TC(vi) would not converge to 1 as vi converged to
1. Thus,
∂O∗i,TC(vi)
∂vi
can never be greater than 1. This fact, along with Equation
1.34, immediately provides the desired result. 
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Lemma 1 states that
∂
−g(n, p, o∗i,TC)(∂g(n,p,o∗i,TC)
∂o∗i,TC
)
 /∂vi < 0 (1.35)
The only avenue through which vi affects −
g(n, p, o∗i,PP )(
∂g(n, p, o∗i,PP )
∂o∗i,PP
) is oi. Further, be-
cause oi is an increasing function of vi, we have
∂
−g(n, p, o∗i,TC)(∂g(n,p,o∗i,TC)
∂o∗i,TC
)
 /∂oi < 0 (1.36)
Inequality (1.36), along with the assumption that o∗i,PP > o∗i,TC , implies that (1.33)
is a contradiction. 
Propositions 3 and 4 tell us that we expect the optimal offer curve for the PPRA
to be weakly below the optimal offer curve for a multiunit reverse discriminative
auction with the same parameter values. The degree to which the optimal offer
curve for the PPRA lies below the optimal offer curve for the multiunit reverse
discriminative auction depends on the parameter values chosen. Note that these
propositions do not make assumptions about the uniqueness of the symmetric
Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the provision point reverse auction, but they do
state that any symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria for the PPRA must be less
than the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the target-constrained auction.
1.5 Experimental Design and Protocol
To test the theoretical predictions, ten experimental sessions were conducted with
a total of 240 undergraduate student participants in Cornell University’s Lab for
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Experimental Economics and Decision Research (LEEDR). 3 Informed consent was
obtained from all participants, in accordance with IRB regulations. The ten ses-
sions were divided into five treatments of two sessions each. The five treatments
consisted of one “budget-constrained” multiunit reverse discriminative treatment
with a budget of $4.42, two “target-constrained” multiunit reverse discriminative
treatments with targets of five and three, and two provision point treatments with
a budget of $4.42, one with a provision point requirement of five and the other
with a provision point requirement of three. For clarity and to ease comparisons
between treatments, this paper will, from this point on, refer to multiunit reverse
discriminative auctions as “target-constrained” auctions and multiunit reverse dis-
criminative auctions with budgets as “budget-constrained” auctions. Each session
lasted at most 40 minutes. Student participants were not allowed to participate
in more than one session, and each session conducted auctions for only one of the
treatments. Thus, all of the following analysis is between-subjects, rather than
within-subjects. Average earnings were approximately $24 for each participant,
with a range from $12 to $35. In each session, the 24 students were split evenly
into three groups. Before the start of each session, the participants were given writ-
ten instructions, which are included in the appendix. These written instructions
include the following information:
1. The number of participants in a group (8).
2. The target or provision point requirement (5 or 3), if relevant.
3. The budget ($4.42), if relevant.
3For the auction to function, 24 undergraduates were required for each session. To increase
the probability of 24 students attending the experiment, 32 students were recruited each session.
Overbooked students were given $10 and allowed to sign up for the experiment during a different
time. On two occasions, less than 24 students showed up for the experiment. These sessions were
cancelled, and the students who showed up were given $10 and allowed to sign up for a different
session in the future.
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4. The common distribution from which all opportunity costs were drawn,
U(0,2).4
A group size of 8 was chosen because relatively small group sizes increased both
the sample and the impact of the provision point requirement. For the first PPRA
treatment a provision point requirement of p = 5 was chosen so that a relatively
large number of participants could contribute to the provision point requirement,
while a target of 6 or 7 individuals might have led to larger offers in the target-
constrained auction. In addition, initial parameters were chosen so that the par-
ticipants in the auction could not divide the budget equally among themselves.
That is, the budget was selected so that the fifth highest opportunity cost in each
group was larger than the budget divided by 5. If at least one of the five lowest
opportunity costs is greater than the budget divided by the provision point re-
quirement, I say the auction is “psychologically binding.” To test the robustness of
the mechanism, these sessions were followed with an additional PPRA treatment
but with a provision point requirement of 3 rather than 5. This second PPRA
treatment was not psychologically binding, as the budget divided by 3 was larger
than the third highest opportunity cost in all groups.
For the purpose of common knowledge, the author read from a series of Pow-
erPoint slides which included an overview of the experimental instructions. After
the PowerPoint presentation, all subjects participated in 5 practice rounds where
parameter values varied. The practice rounds allowed participants to test offering
4Note that individuals drew offers from a U(0,2) distribution rather than a U(0,1), as we as-
sumed in the theory section. This decision was made after conducting a pilot experiment where
individuals drew costs up to $1. I found that, with such low opportunity costs, the individual
rounds were not salient to the participants. Indeed, the participants became increasingly impa-
tient as the session continued. As a result, I reduced the number of rounds to 16 and increased
the maximum opportunity cost to $2. Because the assumed distribution is uniform, this does
not impact theoretical predictions made in propositions 3 and 4.
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strategies without having to worry about affecting their earnings. The practice
rounds also increased the participants familiarity with their mechanism by alter-
ing the parameter values between rounds. The auctions were programmed using
Microsoft Excel. In each round, the participants selected an offer between $0 and
$7, where $7 was set as the maximum allowable offer. After each round, the par-
ticipants were informed whether their offer was accepted and how much they were
paid. If they were in the provision point reverse auction treatment, they were
also informed if the provision point requirement was met. After the five practice
rounds, opportunity costs were re-randomized and a series of 8 rounds began where
the budget, target, provision point requirement and opportunity costs for each in-
dividual were fixed. Before the 9th round, the groups and opportunity costs were
randomized once more and another 8 rounds were conducted to end the experi-
ment. Participants were not paid for the practice rounds, but were paid based on
the results of all 16 rounds that followed.
Figure 1.2 provides gives an example of the interface used by the participants
of a provision point reverse auction. In this example, an individual is preparing
to submit an offer in Round 8. This individual has submitted a variety of offers
in Rounds 1-7, but never received a contract, despite the fact that the provision
point requirement was met in Rounds 1, 3, 4, and 7. This indicates that there were
at least five smaller offers in those rounds. When an individual is ready to submit
an offer, they type their offer into the yellow box and hit the “submit” button.
This sends their offer to the researcher. Once all of 24 participants have submitted
their offers, the researcher resolves the auction and sends the results of the auction
back to the participants. Participants can then hit the “Update” button, which
updates their interface with the results of the previous round and advances them
to the next round.
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Figure 1.3 provides the interface for an individual at the end of a target-
constrained auction. The individual received contracts in Rounds 11 and 12.
For the entire session, the individual earned $12.88, not including show-up fee.
Note that this interface does not include any information about budgets or fund-
ing thresholds, as the target-constrained auction format does not include either
element. The budget-constrained interface is similar to the target-constrained in-
terface, but with a “Budget” row instead of a “Funding Threshold” row.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Difference in Means
The first comparison between auction formats is a simple unconditional difference
in means test between treatments and within rounds. An unconditional difference
in means test is appropriate because the opportunity costs for the participants were
randomized before the experimental sessions and were identical across treatments.
The experimental format provides two sets of 8 rounds which are pooled to increase
statistical power. That is, the offers from Rounds 1 and 9 are considered jointly,
the offers from Rounds 2 and 10 are considered jointly, and so on. Given the
varying parameter values, average offers were compared between formats with
comparable restrictions. That is, the target-constrained auction with a target
of 5, the budget-constrained auction with a budget of $4.42, and the PPRA with
a provision point requirement of 5 and a budget of $4.42 were compared, and then
the target-constrained auction with a target of 3, the budget-constrained auction
with a budget = $4.42, and the PPRA with a provision point requirement of 3
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Figure 1.2: Experiment Interface: Provision Point Reverse Auction
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and a budget of $4.42 were compared. The results are given in Table 1.1 and 1.2
below. For each set of pooled rounds, every treatment has 96 observations. Thus,
each unconditional difference in means test has 192 total observations.
In each table, columns (1), (2) and (3) provide the mean offers for each treat-
ment in each set of rounds, while columns (4) and (5) provide the difference in
means between the treatments and the PPRA. There are several important results
in Table 1.1. First, the target-constrained treatment has higher average offers than
either of the other two treatments. Indeed, the difference in means between the
the provision point reverse auction and the target-constrained treatment is above
$1 in most rounds. The theory predicted that average offers would be higher in the
target-constrained auction than the provision point reverse auction, but the magni-
tude of the differences was unexpected. Second, the budget-constrained treatment
has higher average offers than the PPRA as well, albeit to a lesser extent. In
most rounds, the budget-constrained treatment has offers more than $0.20 higher
than its provision point counterpart. Third, notice that while the average offers
are relatively stable across rounds for the PPRA and budget-constrained auction,
the target-constrained auction saw its average offers decrease over time. This runs
contrary to previously established theoretical results, which suggest offers increase
over time in a target-constrained auction. Instead, it seems individuals submitted
high offers in the first round, and their offers decreased over time as the partici-
pants competed over contracts. This may be a result of the relatively small group
size, as conversation (and therefore collusion) between individuals was not per-
mitted during the experiment. The statistically significant differences in means
support the claim that the PPRA can reduce offers when compared to the target-
or budget-constrained treatments.
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Figure 1.3: Experiment Interface: Target-Constrained Auction
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Table 1.1: Mean Offers – Target = 5, Budget = $4.42, PPR = 5
Mean Offers Difference: PPRA &
(PPRA) (TC) (BC) TC BC
Rounds (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 & 9 1.124 2.716 1.383 1.593*** 0.259***
(0.450) (1.105) (0.687) (0.123) (0.086)
2 & 10 1.115 2.440 1.401 1.324*** 0.285***
(0.487) (0.740) (0.670) (0.090) (0.085)
3 & 11 1.143 2.389 1.372 1.246*** 0.228***
(0.498) (0.644) (0.620) (0.083) (0.081)
4 & 12 1.145 2.257 1.420 1.111*** 0.274***
(0.490) (0.501) (0.859) (0.071) (0.101)
5 & 13 1.137 2.223 1.347 1.086*** 0.209***
(0.464) (0.430) (0.529) (0.065) (0.072)
6 & 14 1.200 2.161 1.335 0.961*** 0.135*
(0.577) (0.371) (0.508) (0.070) (0.078)
7 & 15 1.167 2.090 1.360 0.923*** 0.193**
(0.475) (0.328) (0.550) (0.059) (0.074)
8 & 16 1.186 2.101 1.364 0.915*** 0.178**
(0.576) (0.604) (0.587) (0.085) (0.084)
All 1.152 2.297 1.373 1.115*** 0.220***
(0.507) (0.662) (0.633) (0.030) (0.029)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The above table contains the mean for each of the three auc-
tion treatments and difference in means between the TC and BC
auction treatments and the PPRA, with the standard deviations
and standard errors below for the means or differences in means,
respectively. Each t-test is conducted with a sample of 96 for each
treatment: 24 observations for each Round, with a total of 48 af-
ter the rounds are pooled, and two sessions for each treatment.
PPRA denotes the provision point reverse auction, TC denotes the
target-constrained auction and BC denotes the budget-constrained
auction. The results above are for target-constrained auctions with
a target of 5, a budget-constrained auction with a budget of $4.42
and a provision point reverse auction with a provision point require-
ment of 5 and a budget of $4.42. The offers were pooled by rounds,
so that the offers from rounds 1 and 9 were considered jointly, the
offers from rounds 2 and 10 were considered jointly, etc.
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Table 1.2: Mean Offers – Target = 3, Budget = $4.42, PPR = 3
Mean Offers Difference: PPRA &
(PPRA) (TC) (BC) TC BC
Rounds (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 & 9 1.249 1.631 1.383 0.382*** 0.134
(0.628) (0.556) (0.687) (0.086) (0.095)
2 & 10 1.197 1.454 1.401 0.257*** 0.203**
(0.561) (0.407) (0.670) (0.071) (0.089)
3 & 11 1.252 1.409 1.372 0.157** 0.120
(0.639) (0.381) (0.620) (0.076) (0.091)
4 & 12 1.269 1.400 1.420 0.131 0.151
(0.672) (0.457) (0.859) (0.083) (0.111)
5 & 13 1.239 1.362 1.347 0.123 0.108
(0.636) (0.481) (0.529) (0.081) (0.084)
6 & 14 1.225 1.361 1.335 0.137 0.111
(0.601) (0.695) (0.508) (0.094) (0.080)
7 & 15 1.319 1.339 1.360 0.021 0.041
(0.766) (0.584) (0.550) (0.098) (0.096)
8 & 16 1.323 1.412 1.364 0.089 0.041
(0.922) (0.785) (0.587) (0.124) (0.112)
All 1.259 1.421 1.373 0.162*** 0.114***
(0.685) (0.563) (0.633) (0.032) (0.034)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The above table contains the mean for each of the three auc-
tion treatments and difference in means between the TC and BC
auction treatments and the PPRA, with the standard deviations
and standard errors below for the means or differences in means,
respectively. Each t-test is conducted with a sample of 96 for each
treatment: 24 observations for each Round, with a total of 48 af-
ter the rounds are pooled, and two sessions for each treatment.
PPRA denotes the provision point reverse auction, TC denotes the
target-constrained auction and BC denotes the budget-constrained
auction. The results above are for target-constrained auctions with
a target of 3, a budget-constrained auction with a budget of $4.42
and a provision point reverse auction with a provision point require-
ment of 3 and a budget of $4.42. The offers were pooled by rounds,
so that the offers from rounds 1 and 9 were considered jointly, the
offers from rounds 2 and 10 were considered jointly, etc.
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Table 1.2 provides the results from additional experiments with different pa-
rameter values, where both the target-constraint and the provision point require-
ment were set to 3. First, note that average offers are always less in the PPRA
than either the target- or budget-constrained auction, but that the differences are
not statistically significant in most rounds. This agrees with our intuitive expec-
tations, where a smaller target with a constant budget is less restrictive than a
larger target with the same budget. Indeed, these results are generally consistent
with the contention that, even when the provision point requirement is not more
restrictive than the target or budget constraint, the provision point auction pro-
vides lower average offers. Also note that, with these parameter values, the target-
and budget-constrained auctions provide more comparable average offers than seen
in Table 1.1, where the target-constrained auction resulted in substantially higher
offers.
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 provide differences in means across all offers. The buyer,
however, is primarily interested in the lowest p offers because those offers actually
receive contracts and result in payments from the buyer. Thus, a comparison of
means of the lowest p offers between auction formats would provide more infor-
mation about improvements in the buyer’s welfare than a comparison of all offers.
The difference in means for the lowest five offers between the target-constrained
treatment with a target of five, the budget-constrained treatment with a budget
of $4.42, and the PPRA with a budget of $4.42 and provision point requirement
of five are given in Table 1.3. Table 1.3 shows comparable differences to Table 1.1
and provides additional support that the PPRA may be an attractive alternative
to the target- and budget-constrained auctions from the perspective of the buyer.
Indeed, the mean of the five lowest offers in a PPRA was between 19.4% and 25.6%
smaller in the tested provision point reverse auctions than the comparable budget-
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constrained auction, depending on the round. One advantage of comparing the
lower offers is that large outliers are removed from the comparison. For each set
of pooled rounds in Table 1.3, every treatment has 60 observations. Thus, each
unconditional difference in means test has 120 total observations.
The difference in means for the lowest three offers between the target-
constrained treatment with a target of three, the budget-constrained treatment
with a budget of $4.42, and the PPRA with a budget of $4.42 and provision point
requirement of three are given in Table 1.4. Table 1.4 shows statistically signifi-
cant differences in means between the three auction formats in most rounds, and
thus suggests that the PPRA can yield improvements in the buyer’s welfare for an
additional set of parameter values. More specifically, the mean of the three low-
est offers in tested provision point auctions was between 8.9% and 15.7% smaller
than the comparable mean in the budget-constrained auctions, depending on the
rounds. Indeed, Table 1.4 provides more compelling evidence than Table 1.2 that
the PPRA can lower offers, even when the provision point requirement isn’t “psy-
chologically binding.” For each set of pooled rounds in Table 1.4, every treatment
has 36 observations. Thus, each unconditional difference in means test has 72 to-
tal observations. This provides substantially less power than the tests shown in
Tables 1.1 and 1.2. However, significant differences in offers between the PPRA
and target-constrained auction remain in all pooled rounds. Significant differences
in offers between the PPRA and budget-constrained auctions remain in most of
the pooled rounds as well.
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Table 1.3: Mean Lowest 5 Offers – Pooled Rounds
Mean Offers Difference: PPRA &
PPRA TC BC TC BC
Rounds (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 & 9 0.822 2.160 1.042 1.339*** 0.220***
(0.316) (0.765) (0.394) (0.107) (0.065)
2 & 10 0.814 2.069 1.093 1.255*** 0.280***
(0.292) (0.608) (0.320) (0.087) (0.056)
3 & 12 0.838 2.104 1.095 1.266*** 0.256***
(0.323) (0.495) (0.307) (0.076) (0.058)
4 & 12 0.848 2.027 1.070 1.179*** 0.222***
(0.323) (0.397) (0.306) (0.066) (0.057)
5 & 13 0.854 2.025 1.089 1.171*** 0.235***
(0.299) (0.352) (0.246) (0.060) (0.050)
6 & 14 0.885 2.016 1.103 1.131*** 0.218***
(0.307) (0.333) (0.223) (0.058) (0.049)
7 & 15 0.886 1.962 1.099 1.076*** 0.213***
(0.325) (0.281) (0.223) (0.055) (0.051)
8 & 16 0.870 1.934 1.094 1.064*** 0.225***
(0.310) (0.298) (0.224) (0.056) (0.049)
All 0.852 2.037 1.086 1.185*** 0.234***
(0.311) (0.471) (0.285) (0.026) (0.019)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The above table contains the mean of the lowest five offers
for each of the three auction treatments and difference in means
between the five lowest offers for the TC and BC auction treat-
ments and the PPRA, with the standard deviations and standard
errors below for the means or differences in means, respectively.
Each t-test is conducted with a sample of 60 for each treatment: 15
observations for each Round, with a total of 30 after the rounds are
pooled, and two sessions for each treatment. PPRA denotes the
provision point reverse auction, TC denotes the target-constrained
auction and BC denotes the budget-constrained auction. The re-
sults above are for target-constrained auctions with a target of 5,
a budget-constrained auction with a budget of $4.42 and a provi-
sion point reverse auction with a provision point requirement of 5
and a budget of $4.42. The offers were pooled by rounds, so that
the offers from rounds 1 and 9 were considered jointly, the offers
from rounds 2 and 10 were considered jointly, etc.
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Table 1.4: Mean Lowest 3 Offers – Pooled Rounds
Mean Offers Difference: PPRA &
PPRA TC BC TC BC
Rounds (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 & 9 0.750 1.142 0.823 0.392*** 0.073
(0.279) (0.346) (0.284) (0.074) (0.066)
2 & 10 0.777 1.094 0.922 0.317*** 0.145**
(0.268) (0.257) (0.253) (0.062) (0.061)
3 & 12 0.845 1.100 0.937 0.255*** 0.092
(0.237) (0.248) (0.266) (0.057) (0.059)
4 & 12 0.827 1.081 0.918 0.254*** 0.091
(0.241) (0.224) (0.269) (0.055) (0.060)
5 & 13 0.836 1.033 0.979 0.197*** 0.143**
(0.238) (0.204) (0.231) (0.052) (0.055)
6 & 14 0.864 1.010 0.995 0.176*** 0.131***
(0.211) (0.219) (0.190) (0.051) (0.047)
7 & 15 0.872 0.993 1.002 0.121** 0.130***
(0.193) (0.223) (0.200) (0.049) (0.046)
8 & 16 0.849 0.992 0.998 0.143*** 0.149***
(0.206) (0.200) (0.207) (0.048) (0.049)
All 0.828 1.056 0.947 0.228*** 0.119***
(0.236) (0.247) (0.244) (0.020) (0.020)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The above table contains the mean of the lowest three offers
for each of the three auction treatments and difference in means
between the three lowest offers for the TC and BC auction treat-
ments and the PPRA, with the standard deviations and standard
errors below for the means or differences in means, respectively.
Each t-test is conducted with a sample of 36 for each treatment: 9
observations for each Round, with a total of 18 after the rounds are
pooled, and two sessions for each treatment. PPRA denotes the
provision point reverse auction, TC denotes the target-constrained
auction and BC denotes the budget-constrained auction. The re-
sults above are for target-constrained auctions with a target of 3,
a budget-constrained auction with a budget of $4.42 and a provi-
sion point reverse auction with a provision point requirement of 3
and a budget of $4.42. The offers were pooled by rounds, so that
the offers from rounds 1 and 9 were considered jointly, the offers
from rounds 2 and 10 were considered jointly, etc.
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1.6.2 Offer Functions
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 below display the fitted offer functions and individual offers
(grouped by similar parameter values) observed from experiments across all rounds,
assuming an exponential specification for the offer functions. The exponential
specification was chosen both because of it’s similarity to the optimal offer curve
for the target-constrained auction (see Figure 1) and because it fits the data well,
particularly compared to either a linear or quadratic specification.
Figure 1.4: Comparison of Offer Functions, PPR = 5: All Rounds
These figures show the degree to which individuals submitted offers above their
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Figure 1.5: Comparison of Offer Functions, PPR = 3; All Rounds
opportunity costs across the different treatments and for the different parameter
values. In some instances, individuals submitted offers below their opportunity
costs, represented by the 45 degree line. In a provision point reverse auction, it is
possible that this behavior was altruistic: some individuals decreased their offers
below their opportunity costs in the hope of satisfying the provision point require-
ment, and thus allowing some of their peers to receive profitable contracts. Why
some individuals in the budget-constrained auction chose to submit offers below
their opportunity cost is unclear, although the behavior was largely limited to a few
participants. Each offer function is surrounded by a shaded region, representing
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a 95% confidence interval. Given the large variance in offers within treatments, I
suggest greater consideration of the difference in average offers than the difference
in coefficients on fitted functions. The variance in offers is consistent with individ-
uals struggling to determine optimal offering behavior which is hardly surprising
given the computational difficulty of determining an optimal offer for any of the
three auction formats.
Figures 1.6 and 1.7 provide the offers and fitted offer curves for the first and
ninth rounds and the eighth and sixteenth rounds, respectively, for the treatments
with a target or provision point requirement of five and a budget of $4.42, while
Figures 1.8 and 1.9 provide similar representations of the data for treatments with
a target or provision point requirement of 3 and a budget of $4.42. The first and
ninth rounds are the initial rounds after groups have been re-randomized, while
the eighth and sixteenth rounds are the final rounds before either re-randomization
or the conclusion of the experiment.
1.6.3 Efficiency Analysis
This paper is interested not only in comparing the three auction treatments with
each other, but also against the theoretical predictions for the uniform reverse
auction. In a uniform reverse auction, the buyer sets a target and the winning
individuals receive the first rejected offer as payment, similar to a Vickrey second
price auction. Theoretically, we expect individuals in a uniform procurement auc-
tion will submit their opportunity costs as their offers. To compare the auction
formats this paper uses three criteria to measure their efficacy. The first measure
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Figure 1.6: Comparison of Offer Functions, PPR = 5: First Rounds (1 & 9)
is social efficiency, which is defined as follows:
Social Efficiency =
∑p
i=1 v(i)∑p
i=1 vi
× 100 (1.37)
where v(i) is the ith smallest opportunity cost in the auction. In other words, so-
cial efficiency is the minimum opportunity cost required to supply five contracts
divided by the sum of the opportunity costs of the individuals who actually re-
ceived contracts. From society’s perspective, welfare is maximized when the lowest
opportunity cost individuals receive the available contracts. However, this result
is not necessarily the case in instances with positive externalities like one might
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Figure 1.7: Comparison of Offer Functions, PPR = 5: Last Rounds (8 & 16)
expect from PES programs. Nonetheless, the measure informative.
The second measure is simply the total cost to the buyer of purchasing p con-
tracts. This allows us to compare cost savings for the buyer across the different
auction mechanisms, and thus the amount of money the buyer must spend, on
average, for the p units.
Finally, this paper uses a “cost effectiveness” measure to further compare how
costly the auctions are for the buyer. This measure is defined as follows:
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Figure 1.8: Comparison of Offer Functions, PPR = 3: First Rounds (1 & 9)
Cost Effectiveness = Uniform Auction Cost−Other Auction CostUniform Auction Cost− Total Opportunity Cost (1.38)
By definition, if the participants submitted offers equal to their opportunity costs,
the cost efficiency measure would be 100%, while the cost efficiency measure is 0%
for the uniform auction.
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 below provide the efficiency and cost effectiveness measures
for the various auctions by their parameter values. The OC column provides the
measures for a hypothetical discriminative auction where individuals submit their
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Figure 1.9: Comparison of Offer Functions, PPR = 3: Last Rounds (8 & 16)
opportunity costs as offers. In such an auction, all of the welfare gains would be
given to the buyer and the auction would be 100% socially efficient. As such,
it serves as the ideal auction from the perspective of the buyer. There are two
important problems to discuss before continuing to the efficiency measures. First,
we cannot compare the budget-constrained auction to the other formats directly
with these measures because the buyer, in the experiments, was never able to afford
5 contracts in the budget-constrained treatment. Thus, questions including, “how
much did it cost the buyer to purchase five contracts” are nonsensical for budget-
constrained auction. Second, the provision point auctions didn’t always result
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Table 1.5: Efficiency Measures, Target/PPR = 5
OC Uniform TC PPRA
Social Efficiency 100% 100% 71.46% 95.98%(14.89%) (9.40%)
Avg. Total Cost of $3.02 $6.64 $10.19 $4.07Providing 5 Units
Cost Effectiveness 100% 0% -97.96% 71.12%(29.65%) (12.03%)
Note: The above table contains efficiency measures for several dif-
ferent auction formats. Standard errors are enclosed in parentheses
below their given estimates. The OC column contains the results
from a theoretical discriminative auction where all individuals sub-
mit their opportunity costs as offers. The Uniform column contains
the predicted results from a uniform price auction. The TC col-
umn contains the experimental results for the target-constrained
auction and the PPRA column contains the experimental results
for the provision point reverse auction in rounds where the provi-
sion point requirement was met.
in contracts in the treatment with PPR = 5, as the provision point requirement
wasn’t met in approximately 33% of the rounds. (The PPR was met in every
round for the treatment with PPR = 3.) As a result, it isn’t always sensible to
compare the PPRA to the target-constrained and uniform price auctions. Instead,
this paper presents only the efficiency measure for the PPRA when the provision
point requirement was met. This alters the efficiency estimates slightly when the
PPR = 5, but does not alter the analysis when the PPR = 3.
Unsurprisingly, given the theoretical predictions, the target-constrained auc-
tion performs the worst by all three measures, regardless of the parameter values.
Indeed, the target-constrained auction costs over twice as much, on average, as the
provision point reverse auction and costs nearly 80% more than the predictions for
the uniform auction as well, when p = 5. On the other hand, the provision point
reverse auction was only slightly less socially efficient than the predictions for the
uniform auction when p = 5, although the PPRA achieved lower social efficiency
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Table 1.6: Efficiency Measures, Target/PPR = 3
OC Uniform TC PPRA
Social Efficiency 100% 100% 64.61% 76.8%(24.65%) (22.85%)
Avg. Total Cost of $1.06 $2.64 $3.17 $2.48Providing 3 Units
Cost Effectiveness 100% 0% -33.82% 9.66%(34.21%) (35.92%)
Note: The above table contains efficiency measures for several dif-
ferent auction formats. Standard errors are enclosed in parentheses
below their given estimates. The OC column contains the results
from a theoretical discriminative auction where all individuals sub-
mit their opportunity costs as offers. The Uniform column contains
the predicted results from a uniform price auction. The TC col-
umn contains the experimental results for the target-constrained
auction and the PPRA column contains the experimental results
for the provision point reverse auction in rounds where the provi-
sion point requirement was met.
than the predictions for the uniform price auction when p = 3. In summary, the
PPRA performs better than the uniform price auction from the perspective of the
buyer, while it performs slightly worse than the uniform price auction by social ef-
ficiency. However, the difference in the social efficiency measure is not statistically
significant for the session where the provision point requirement was equal to 5.
1.7 Discussion
Given the structure of the PPRA, I believe it will be particularly effective when
three criteria hold true. First, if there is a threshold of interest the PPRA can
ensure the government either some level of environmental service or the welfare
they obtain from retaining their budget and expending it on an alternative PES
program.
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Second, I believe that the PPRA will be particularly effective for auctions with
small numbers of participants who all operate in a given region. As the number of
participants in a PPRA becomes smaller, the ability of any individual to affect the
probability the provision point requirement is met increases, which increases the
impact of the provision point requirement on offering behavior (See Propositions
3 and 4). Further, I believe that individuals who know each other will be more
likely to take the welfare of the other participants into account. As such, a PPRA
which takes place in a particular region may increase the salience of the provision
point requirement even further.
Finally, the PPRA will be most effective at reducing offers when the cost of
running an auction is low and when the buyer can move the program to a new
location when the provision point requirement isn’t met. The buyer may forgo
substantial welfare opportunities if they cannot eventually provide contracts to
some individuals, and thus the ability to move the auction to a new location at
relatively little cost will decrease the chance the buyer will not able to purchase
some environmental service.
As an example of a setting which satisfies these three criteria, consider the
BirdReturn© program in California. In the BirdReturn© program, rice farmers in
the Central Valley of California are paid by conservationists and aviphiles to flood
their paddies to create small habitats for migratory birds. The number of rice
farmers in a given area is relatively small, and if a certain number of these “pop-
up habitats” are not created, then the birds will not be able to use the regions
as stepping stones along their journey. There are several potential areas in the
Central Valley that could serve as pop-up habitats, so the conservationists and
aviphiles could move to a new location if they cannot afford a certain number of
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contracts.
While the provision point reverse auction has the potential to function well in
some settings, it certainly would not be appropriate for all procurement auctions.
For example, electricity markets use reverse auctions to allocate contracts to energy
producers. A PPRA in this context would mean that no electricity would be
produced when the provision point requirement is not met, which would be an
unacceptable outcome given that demand for electricity is inelastic.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper introduces a new auction mechanism designed for conservation and
PES settings. The Provision Point Reverse Auction uses co-dependent expected
profit functions for the individuals seeking to provide environmental services to
decrease rent-seeking behavior. This decrease in strategic behavior has the po-
tential to increase the efficiency and cost effectiveness of conservation and PES
programs, while simultaneously decreasing uncertainty for the purchasers of the
environmental goods. The experimental and theoretical results support this claim,
showing that the PPRA can save the procurer between 21.55% to 58.17% or 12.57%
to 21.59% of their costs on average, when comparing to a multiunit reverse dis-
criminative auction or budget-constrained multiunit reverse discriminative auction,
respectively, with the exact value dependent upon the target number of contracts.
Given that environmental or conservation goods often include positive externali-
ties, lower offers can lead to welfare increases for society. Further, the PPRA also
improves social efficiency over the multiunit reverse discriminative auction, reduc-
ing the total cost of the environmental service to society. Future research will
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expand the empirical support for the PPRA to field settings or continue theoreti-
cal examination to consider optimal offering behavior in multiple rounds. Settings
where environmental benefits are a function of spatial proximity of conserved land
also provide a particularly fruitful area of research.
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CHAPTER 2
UNCERTAINTY IN PREFERENCES AND BEHAVIORAL
ANOMALIES
2.1 Abstract
Recent research has considered the possibility that uncertainty in preferences plays
a role in observed behavioral anomalies. This paper builds upon this work by using
experimental methods to vary individual uncertainty in a laboratory setting and
measure the resulting change in behavior. The first set of experiments examines
the effect of uncertainty in preferences on exchange asymmetries, a well-established
phenomena where individuals who are randomly endowed with an item are less
likely to trade that item for an alternative. Participants were randomly endowed
with one of two varieties of chocolate, with the two varieties only identified by a
shape stapled to otherwise identical bags. In the control sessions, participants were
asked whether they would like to trade their chocolate for the alternate variety with
no further information. In the treatment sessions, individuals were allowed to taste
each variety of chocolate before making their decision. While large exchange asym-
metries were observed in control sessions, no exchange asymmetry was observed in
the treatment sessions, suggesting that uncertainty in preferences may play a large
role in the behavioral anomaly. The second set of experiments examines the effect
of uncertainty in preferences on the WTA/WTP disparity. Some participants were
randomly endowed with chocolate while others were not. After valuing a sequence
of assets which yielded random returns, the participants were asked to use a BDM
to estimate their willingness to accept or willingness to pay for the chocolate. In
the treatment sessions, the participants were allowed to taste a small amount of
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the chocolate before making a decision. While a WTA/WTP disparity was ob-
served in both treatment and control sessions, the magnitude of the disparity was
smaller in the treatment session than in the control session. These results suggest
that uncertainty in preferences may play a large role in the magnitude of observed
WTA/WTP disparities as well. Given that individuals are often very uncertain
about their preferences for environmental amenities, the results are particularly
important for environmental economics and contingent valuation.
2.2 Introduction
Exchange asymmetries occur when individuals who are endowed with a good are
less likely to trade that good for an alternative. If 30 people are randomly endowed
with a bar of chocolate and another 30 people are randomly endowed with a coffee
mug, individuals with reversible indifference curves will, on average, trade their
item for the alternate 50% of the time, regardless of the preferences of the popula-
tion. For example, if 90% of individuals prefer the chocolate to the mug, then, on
average, 27 of the 30 people endowed with the mug will trade for the chocolate and
3 of the 30 people endowed with the chocolate will trade for the mug for a total of
30 out of 60 possible trades. An exchange asymmetry has occurred when less than
50% of the population trades their item for the alternate. A similar behavioral
anomaly, the willingness-to-accept/willingness-to-pay (WTA/WTP) disparity, oc-
curs when individuals indicate a willingness-to-accept to lose a good that is much
higher than a willingness-to-pay for that good. Both of the above anomalies clash
with standard and commonly used assumptions in economic theory, many of which
imply that ownership of a good should not impact an individual’s preference for
that good.
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The implications of these anomalies are significant and broad. For example, if
WTA is truly higher than WTP for most individuals and goods, then measuring
WTA instead of WTP in contingent valuation studies will have a great impact
on the estimated values for the environment. Kim, Kling, and Zhao consider
four possible cases in their review of the WTA/WTP disparity and environmental
policy:[24]
1. For an environmental improvement, if the property rights lie with the en-
vironmental improvement, then willingness to accept for not receiving the
improvement should be measured.
2. For an environmental improvement, if the property rights lie with the de-
graded environment, then willingness to pay for the improvement should be
measured.
3. For an environmental degradation, if the property rights lie with the environ-
mental improvement, then willingness to accept for obtaining the degradation
should be measured.
4. For an environmental degradation, if the property rights lie with the degraded
environment, then willingness to pay to avoid the degradation should be
measured.
The disparity between WTA and WTP is often economically substantial.
Horowitz and McConnell, in their review of WTA/WTP studies, find a mean
WTA/WTP ratio of 7; that is, their review of the literature suggests that an in-
dividual’s WTA for a good is, on average, seven times their WTP for that same
good. [19] The authors suggest that such a high WTA/WTP ratio could have
profound effects on land preservation in the United States and abroad. Borges
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and Knetsch suggest that trade and profit forecasts would be severely flawed if
a WTA-WTP disparity exists but is not accounted for. [4] Additionally, if the
ownership of a good is relevant for it’s final value, then the assignment of property
rights is critically important, and would likely negate a central requirement of the
Coase Theorem.
The literature investigating the endowment effect has largely focused on theo-
ries of loss aversion [23], substitutability [16], and experimental validity [39, 40]. A
smaller portion of the literature has considered the possibility that imprecise pref-
erences might explain at least part of the observed behavioral anomalies, including
the WTP/WTA disparity, exchange asymmetries, and preference reversals. [9, 32]
Unfortunately, the experimental evidence on this topic is limited.
This paper contributes to the experimental and behavioral economics literature
by running laboratory experiments to directly measure the effect of uncertainty in
preferences on the existence and magnitude of behavioral anomalies. Identifying
changes in uncertainty can be challenging. This paper uses chocolate and a “taste”
treatment to change the information individuals have about their own preferences.
While some previous papers have included a “taste” component in their experi-
mental design, none have done so in a way which allows for causal comparisons
across information levels. [9, 18] In the first set of experiments, half of the partic-
ipants are randomly endowed with one variety of chocolate and the other half of
participants are endowed with a different variety of chocolate. In control sessions,
the participants are given almost no information about the chocolate and asked if
they would like to trade their variety of chocolate for the alternate variety. In the
treatment sessions, individuals are given the opportunity to taste small amounts
of both varieties of chocolate before they make their trade decisions. Individu-
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als with reversible indifference curves (a common assumption in micro-economic
theory) should, on average, trade 50% of the time, regardless of the population’s
preferences between the two varieties of chocolate. In the control sessions, almost
no participants traded their chocolate for the alternate variety; that is, we observe
a large exchange asymmetry. In the treatment sessions, however, almost 50% of
participants traded, matching standard economic theory. These results suggest
that, in at least some settings, uncertainty in preferences may explain some, or
even all, of the observed exchange asymmetries.
A second set of experiments uses a similar taste treatment to examine the role
that uncertainty in preferences may play in the WTA/WTP disparity. In both
treatment and control sessions, half of the participants were endowed with an
unmarked bag of chocolate. Participants then engaged in a sequence of Becker-
Degroot-Marschak (BDM) auctions for lotteries to build familiarity with the mech-
anism. [3] Once these auctions were completed, the WTA and WTP of the partici-
pants for the chocolate was elicited, again using a BDM. In the treatment sessions,
participants were allowed to taste a small amount of the chocolate before making
their decisions. The results show that, while a statistically significant WTA/WTP
disparity was observed in both treatment and control sessions, the magnitude of
the disparity was substantially diminished in the treatment sessions.
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2.3 Theory and Literature Review
2.3.1 Uncertainty in Preferences
There is a small, but growing, literature discussing the relationship between un-
certainty in preferences and the WTA/WTP disparity. The most common form
of uncertainty considered in the literature is ‘product uncertainty’: an uncertainty
over or imprecision in one’s own valuations of the good itself, usually due to a lack
of familiarity [12, 18]. Loomes et al. (2009) refer to this as ‘intrinsic uncertainty’
which they distinguish from uncertainty regarding the states in which a good will
be consumed, or ‘extrinsic uncertainty’ [32]. This paper considers the effect intrin-
sic uncertainty may have on behavioral anomalies by experimentally varying the
probabilities of “taste” states.
In their work on uncertain preferences, Dubourg, Jones-Lee, and Loomes sug-
gest that, in many settings, people have neither enough time for introspection nor
enough information about the relevant product to form precise valuations. [12]
Instead, they might only be able to identify a range within which their true value
lies. The authors refer to these ranges as “personal confidence intervals”. They sug-
gest that such a setting can credibly explain a significant part of the WTA/WTP
disparity, as caution or bargaining instincts may lead people to both draw a value
from the lower end of the range when asked for their willingness to pay, and choose
a value from the upper end of the range when asked to report their willingness to
accept. This intuition is similar to individuals implementing a maximin expected
utility strategy in the face of uncertain outcomes as suggested by Schmeidler et
al. [47]. Under the Dubourg et al. framework, allowing participants to taste the
chocolate would effectively collapse the corresponding personal confidence intervals
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to a single point (their true preference for the chocolate), thereby eliminating any
WTA/WTP disparity.
Zhao and Kling, in their research on the cost of commitment, suggest that
even for individuals who do not exhibit loss aversion or the endowment effect, a
WTA/WTP disparity can be observed in a dynamic setting if there is a cost to
committing to a good for which their value is uncertain. [53, 54] In the authors’
model, commitment costs occur when: (1) the individual is uncertain about the
value of the good, (2) the individual anticipates that they will be able to learn more
about the good’s value in the future, (3) the individual has some willingness to wait
for that additional information, (4) there is a cost associated with reversing the
acquisition or loss of the good, and (5) the individual is forced to make their trading
decision in the present. In the experiments discussed in this paper, we consider
static, one-shot decisions in which there are no transaction costs, as defined above.
While there is certainly uncertainty regarding the value of the good, there is no
opportunity to trade the good once the experiment has concluded. The following
theory and experimental results in this paper suggest that commitment costs are
not required for uncertainty in preferences to impact the WTA/WTP disparity.
A final form of uncertainty discussed in the literature is uncertainty regarding
the valuation mechanism and market inexperience. For example, if individuals are
unsure how a BDM works, they may state values which are inaccurate, which may
result in behavioral anomalies. Several authors have conducted work examining
the effect of market experience on behavioral anomalies, including the WTA/WTP
disparity and preference reversals [9, 39, 30, 31]. The general finding from this
body of research is that market experience at least diminishes the WTA/WTP
disparity, and in many papers the disparity vanishes altogether. To accomodate
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this possibility, the experiments conducted for this paper include several practice
and paid rounds with a BDM to ensure participants had market experience before
making their chocolate valuation decisions.
2.3.2 WTA/WTP Disparity: Loomes et al. Results
In their paper on taste uncertainty and status quo effects, Loomes, Orr, and Sug-
den establish a theoretical framework for examining the effect of uncertainty in
preferences on behavioral anomalies [32]. Their framework builds on the existing
state-dependent and reference-dependent utility literature [45, 25, 48]. As far as
this author is aware, only one other paper has attempted to experimentally ex-
amine the effect of uncertainty in preferences on behavioral anomalies within the
Loomes et al. framework [13]. Georgantz´ıs and Nikolaos and Navarro-Mart´ınez
use a survey to measure participants’ knowledge of goods, along with other atti-
tudinal factors. They find that differences in personality profiles contribute to the
WTA/WTP gap. In particular, their results suggest that risk aversion and famil-
iarity with the good may be correlated with elicited WTA, but not WTP. This
paper provides a more rigorous causal mechanism by using a “taste” treatment
which does not rely on individuals’ stated uncertainty. This section will first intro-
duce the theory and results presented by Loomes et al. (2009), and then consider
the experiments conducted in this paper within their framework.
Suppose that the set of all states is given by S = {s1, ..., sm}, and that all bun-
dles generate a “consequence” in any state. For example, the bundle x generates
the consequence c(x, sh) when state sh is realized. Following reference dependent
stated expected utility theory (RDSEUT), as introduced by Sugden, we require
three functions to specify preference relations [48]. First, we have a probabil-
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ity function, Π(·) with ∑h Π(sh) = 1, which gives the probability that any given
state will occur. Second, we have a utility function, u(·), which assigns a number
to each possible “consequence.” Finally, we have a gain/loss evaluation function,
φ(·), which we assume is continuous and weakly concave, with φ(0) = 0. Building
on RDSEUT, Loomes et al. say that the bundle x is preferred to the bundle y,
conditional on the current reference bundle z, if and only if:
∑
h
Π(sh)φ(uh[c(x, sh)]−uh[c(z, sh)]) ≥
∑
h
Π(sh)φ(uh[c(y, sh)]−uh[c(z, sh)]) (2.1)
From this point, uh[c(x, sh)] will be simplified to uh[x] for notational conve-
nience. If φ(·) is a linear function, then (2.1) yields the results from expected
utility theory; willingness to accept equals willingness to pay. If φ(·) is concave,
however, individuals with the above preferences will exhibit loss aversion; this re-
flects the intuition that individuals experience losses more severely than gains of
the same magnitude. Let Uh and Vh describe the marginal utilities of goods 1 and
2 evaluated at the reference bundle z, respectively. That is, Uh = ∂uh(x1,x2)∂x1 and
Uh = ∂uh(x1,x2)∂x2 . We can normalize the units of the two goods so that:
∑
h
Π(sh)Uh =
∑
h
Π(sh)Vh = 1 (2.2)
Next, the authors indexed the states so that U1/V1 ≥ U2/V2 ≥ ... ≥ Um/Vm.
That is, the states are indexed so that the smallest numbered states have the largest
relative preference for good 1 compared to good 2. Finally, φ(·) is normalized so
that φ′(t) converges to 1 as t converges to 0 from above and φ′(t) converges to β
as t converges to 0 from below. The larger β, the larger the disparity between the
value attributed to equally sized gains and losses. Denote the marginal willingness
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to accept for good 1 in terms of good 2 by rWTA21 . rWTA21 provides the amount of
good 2 that an individual must be given to compensate them for the loss of one
unit of good 1. Note that:
rWTA21 =
1
rWTP12
(2.3)
To see that (2.3) holds, consider a scenario where an individual has 10 units
of good 1 and 5 units of good 2. If rWTA21 = 1.5, then the individual is indifferent
between the bundle (x1 = 10, x2 = 5) and (x1 = 9, x2 = 6.5). Given that the
individual is indifferent between those two bundles, the individual must also be
willing to pay one unit of good 1 to gain 1.5 units of good 2; that is, rWTP12 =
1
1.5 =
1
rWTA21
.
If rWTA21 is known, then all states can be split into loss states (L = {s1, ..., sK})
and gain states (G = {sK+1, ..., sm}), where K is such that Uh/Vh ≥ rWTA21 for
s1, ..., sK , and Uh/Vh < rWTA21 for sK+1, ..., sm. Suppose that an individual with
these preferences is given rWTA21 units of good 2 in exchange for a unit of good 1.
Then, given that the individual is indifferent to the exchange, we have:
∑
h∈L
Π(sh)β(rWTA21 Vh − Uh) +
∑
h∈G
Π(sh)(rWTA21 Vh − Uh) = 0 (2.4)
Rearranging this equation yields1:
rWTA21 =
[β∑h∈L Π(sh)Uh +∑h∈G Π(sh)Uh]
[β∑h∈L Π(sh)Vh +∑h∈G Π(sh)Vh] (2.5)
1rWTA12 can be derived using a similar method.
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Given (2.2), when β = 1, rWTA21 = rWTA12 = 1. Additionally, given (2.3), when
β = 1, there is no WTA/WTP disparity. If, however, β > 1, the additional weight
added to the “loss” states results in a WTA/WTP disparity which increases as β
increases. That is, under RDSEUT and in the presence of both loss aversion and
intrinsic uncertainty, we expect a WTA/WTP disparity. Even more, the magnitude
of that disparity increases as β increases.
2.3.3 WTA/WTP Disparity: Loomes et al. Application
As detailed in Section 2.4, participants in the WTA/WTP disparity control sessions
were asked to value an unmarked bag of chocolate using a BDM, while participants
in the treatment sessions were allowed to taste a small amount of the chocolate
before stating their value. To interpret these experiments in reference to Loomes et
al. (2009), suppose that ex ante, participants believe that there are only two states:
sG, where the chocolate tastes good, and sB, where the chocolate tastes bad.2 In
control sessions, each individual participant has some subjective prediction about
the probability of each state, given by Π(sG) and Π(sB). In treatment sessions, the
small taste of chocolate eliminates all uncertainty about the “taste” state outcome;
that is, either Π(sG) or Π(sB) becomes 1. In this section, we show that, using the
same assumptions as Loomes et al. (2009), as the probability of one state converges
to 1, the WTA/WTP disparity converges to 0, even in the presence of loss aversion.
[32]
In this paper’s WTA/WTP disparity experiments, bundles consist of two goods:
chocolate and money. For individuals endowed with chocolate (that is, individuals
2The theoretical predictions shown hold when the number of possible states accounts for a
larger variety of discrete taste outcomes.
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submitting a WTA value) the reference bundle can therefore be represented as
z = (chocolate, w($)), where w represents the initial wealth of the participant at
the time of exchange. Given the incentive compatibility of the BDM, the elicited
WTA is such that
x = (chocolate, w($)) ∼ y = (0, w +WTA($)) (2.6)
That is, participants are indifferent between keeping the chocolate and their orig-
inal wealth, or giving up the chocolate in exchange for a payment in the amount
of WTA.
Given the initial bundle, we can denote the marginal utilities for chocolate
under the good and bad taste states as UG and UB. Since the value of money is
not contingent on the taste state and changes in income within the experiment
and across treatments are small, it is reasonable to assume that there is only one
relevant marginal utility of money relative to the reference state, which we will
denote by V . In this case, (2.5) reduces to
rWTAc,$ =
[βΠ(sB)UB + Π(sG)UG]
[βΠ(sB)V + Π(sG)V ]
(2.7)
Under the treatment condition, participants are able to learn which taste state
has occurred in practice. That is, either the chocolate tastes bad (Π(sB) = 1 and
Π(sG) = 0) or the chocolate tastes good (Π(sB) = 0 and Π(sG) = 1.) Given the
normalization in (2.2), this implies that UB = V when Π(sB) = 1 and UG = V when
Π(sG) = 1. Thus, with the full taste treatment, the model predicts rWTAc,$ = 1 under
the relevant normalization. The same can be shown for rWTA$,c , which is equivalent
to 1/rWTPc,$ from (2.8). This implies that the WTA/WTP ratio must equal 1. We
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can thus conclude that, when individuals are given certainty about “taste” state
outcomes, the model predicts no WTA/WTP disparity even in the presence of loss
aversion.
The same result can be shown more intuitively using explicit differences in
absolute utility. Recalling that participants endowed with chocolate face an initial
reference bundle z = (chocolate, w($)) and using the bundles given in (2.6), a BDM
elicits a WTA such that:
Π(sG)φ(uG[x]− uG[z]) + Π(sB)φ(uB[x]− uB[z])
=Π(sG)φ(uG[y]− uG[z]) + Π(sB)φ(uB[y]− uB[z])
(2.8)
The above equation states that WTA will be chosen to equate the sum of
probability-weighted utility across states, accounting for the loss aversion result-
ing from the φ(·) function. This equation follows directly from RDSEUT. In the
experimental context of this paper, the left-hand side of the above equation equals
0 since x and z are the same bundle; that is, if you do not sell your chocolate, you
have the same bundle as your initial endowment. Note that, by the definition of
the states and bundles, (uG[y]− uG[z]) < 0 while (uB[y]− uB[z]) > 0. (I.e., when
the good state occurs, if you sell your chocolate when you gave WTA($) for your
value, you are worse off than you would be at your initial endowment, while in
the bad state, if you sell your chocolate when you gave WTA($) for your value,
you are better off than you would be at your initial endowment.) Additionally, we
know that the following holds:
|(uG[y]− uG[z])| < |(uB[y]− uB[z])| (2.9)
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The above follows from the loss aversion inherent in φ(·) which amplifies the
loss associated with giving up the chocolate in state sG. Thus, in control sessions,
loss aversion may affect WTA and cause a WTA/WTP disparity. Recall that under
the treatment condition, however, either Π(sG) = 0 or Π(sB) = 0. In order for the
equality in (2.8) to hold, either Π(sG) = 1 and
φ(uG[y]− uG[z]) = 0 (2.10)
or Π(sB) = 1 and
φ(uB[y]− uB[z]) = 0 (2.11)
Since φ(·) is assumed to be continuous, increasing and weakly concave with
φ(0) = 0, the only way (2.10) or (2.11) can hold is if uG[y] − uG[z] = 0 when
Π(sG) = 1 or uB[y] − uB[z] = 0 when Π(sB) = 1.3 Assuming that the utility
function, u(·), satisfies the requirements of rational expected utility theory (as
assumed by Loomes et al. (2009) and RDSEUT), the irrelevance of φ(·) when one
of the states is certain to occur implies that WTA will be chosen to equate utility
across bundles within states, regardless of the existence of loss aversion.
For individuals not endowed with chocolate and asked for their WTP to pur-
chase chocolate, their initial endowment is z = (0, w($)). The BDM’s incentive
compatibility should result in WTP values that satisfy:
3Note that the WTA elicited under the treatment and control condition will differ based on
this reduction in taste state uncertainty, meaning that lottery y differs in terms of the relevant
amount of money under these scenarios.
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a = (0, w($)) ∼ b = (chocolate, w −WTP ($)) (2.12)
That is, even in the presence of loss aversion, an individual’s elicited WTP
should lead to indifference between purchasing the chocolate and losing money
and not purchasing chocolate and keeping all their wealth. The WTP version of
(2.8) is
Π(sG)φ(uG[a]− uG[z]) + Π(sB)φ(uB[a]− uB[z])
=Π(sG)φ(uG[b]− uG[z]) + Π(sB)φ(uB[b]− uB[z])
(2.13)
Similar to before, the above equation states that WTP will be chosen to equate
the sum of probability-weighted utility across states, accounting for the loss aver-
sion resulting from the φ(·) function. Once again, because a and z represent the
same bundle, the left hand side of (2.13) is 0. As before, when there is uncertainty
over which taste state can occur, loss aversion can yield a WTP which is not equal
to the individual’s true value for the chocolate. When there is certainty over which
state will occur, however, either Π(sG) = 1 and
φ(uG[a]− uG[z]) = 0 (2.14)
or Π(sB) = 1 and
φ(uB[b]− uB[z]) = 0 (2.15)
This yields a similar conclusion to the one above: the irrelevance of φ(·) when
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one state is certain to occur implies that WTP will be chosen to equate util-
ity across bundles within states, regardless of loss aversion. When differences in
wealth between WTA and WTP individuals are sufficient to account for any pos-
sible income effects, the resulting WTA and WTP values should be equivalent, on
average, across the population.
2.3.4 Uncertainty in Preferences and Exchange Asymme-
tries
The above theory assumed that the source of uncertainty was limited to the quality
of the chocolate, but an additional possible source of uncertainty is translating the
value for chocolate into its monetary equivalent. That is, the taste treatment
allows participants to know whether they like the chocolate or not, but it does
not guarantee that individuals will know with precision how much they value that
chocolate in dollars. Indeed, the BDM may fail to elicit the “true” value for the
chocolate, even under the “taste” certainty treatment. If individuals have poorly
defined or “fuzzy” preferences, there may be no “true” value for the chocolate at
all.
Fortunately, the exchange asymmetry experiments avoid these problems, as,
unlike the experiments measuring WTA and WTP, the exchange asymmetry ses-
sions do not interact money and chocolate. As discussed in Section 2.4, participants
are only given the option to keep their current chocolate or trade for an alternate
variety. The most prominent explanation for the existence of exchange asymme-
tries is the “endowment effect,” which suggests that individuals place a greater
value on objects they own than on objects they do not possess. An alternate hy-
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pothesis states that experimental procedures may account for the anomaly. The
experimental design used in this paper is specifically modelled to account for this
possibility, as discussed in Section 2.4.[39, 40]
An additional explanation states that transaction costs for trading may account
for the disparity. [38] For example, suppose that there are two possible bundles, x =
(Square Chocolate) and y = (Circle Chocolate). Now, suppose that an individual
prefers the square chocolate bundle to the circle chocolate bundle. In a rational
expected utility framework with no costs for trading, an individual who prefers the
alternate bundle will always trade for the alternate bundle and an individual who
prefers their current bundle will always keep their current bundle. If individuals
are randomly endowed with their bundle, on average, about half of participants
will trade for the alternate variety, regardless of the preferences of the population.
However, suppose that there is a cost for trading, c > 0. For some participants,
it is possible that this transaction cost would outweigh the gains from trading,
resulting in less than the predicted number of trades in the absence of transaction
costs and an exchange asymmetry. The larger the transaction cost, the greater the
probable asymmetry, until the transaction costs are so great that no individual
will trade. In the experiments discussed in this paper, the only transaction costs
which occur are the cost of the trade itself: if an individual wishes to trade their
chocolate for an alternate variety, they must take their chocolate to the front of the
room and and hand it to the researcher at the conclusion of the experiment when
they collect their earnings. Nonetheless, even minute transaction costs may cause
exchange asymmetries when individuals are very uncertain about the value of their
good. For example, if an individual is so uncertain about the relative quality of
the “square” and “circle” chocolate that they are essentially indifferent between
the two, even a minuscule transaction cost, like the one present in the experiments
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conducted for this paper, could lead to large exchange asymmetries.
Some researchers have also posited “Query Theory” as a framework which can
explain the WTA/WTP disparity.[22] In Query Theory, the process by which in-
dividuals value goods affects their final valuation. Specifically, if individuals are
endowed with a good and asked for their WTA for the good, they first consider
their preferences for the good and then consider their preferences for money. In-
dividuals who are asked for their WTP for a good, however, consider the money
first and then construct their value for the good. Query Theory posits that the
order of these thought processes matter, that more consideration will be given to
the first queries. More simply: sellers focus on the good they would give up and
buyers focus on the money they would pay. To substantiate their theory, John-
son et al. conducted experiments which found that when query order is reversed
for participants in a lab setting, they can eliminate the endowment effect. It is
possible that preference uncertainty and Query Theory interact to increase the
magnitude of observed behavioral anomalies. For example, if valuation queries are
more difficult for goods with greater intrinsic uncertainty, this may lead to an even
greater emphasis placed on the initial queries, further expanding the gap between
WTA and WTP.
2.4 Experimental Design
To test the impact of uncertainty in preferences on behavioral anomalies, two sets
of experiments were conducted. Experimental participants were limited to stu-
dents or staff at Cornell University. The first set of experiments examined the
impact of uncertainty in preferences on exchange asymmetries. To control for
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concerns regarding experimental methods and validity, the exchange asymmetry
sessions roughly followed the experimental design used by Plott and Zeiler in their
exchange asymmetry experiments. [40] Participants were randomly assigned seats
upon entering the lab. Each participant was gifted with one of two varieties of
chocolate, identified only by a square or circle stapled to the bags (See Appendix
B.1 for pictures of the chocolate bags.) The “circle” variety bags contained half
of a Ghiradelli “Milk Chocolate & Caramel” bar, while the “square” variety bags
contained half of a Ghiradelli “Intense Dark: Twilight Delight” bar. The brand
and name of the chocolate bars were not given to the participants, although they
were told that both varieties of chocolate were manufactured by the same com-
pany. The variety of chocolate given to each participant was determined by their
random seat assignment: participants with odd numbered seats were given one
variety of chocolate while participants with even numbered seats were given the
alternate variety. The assignment of the chocolate was randomized to ensure that
participants did not take the gift of their variety of chocolate as a signal of its
relative value. Finally, when participants were given the chocolate, it was placed
directly on the desk in front of them. They were permitted to handle the bag, but
not to open it or look inside. The chocolate was placed in front of the participants
to ensure that they felt they had ownership over their good.
Once the participants had been given their chocolate, the researcher read from
one of two scripts, depending on whether the session was a treatment or a control
session (See Appendix B.2 for the full scripts.) Unlike some of the designs imple-
mented by Plott and Zeiler in their exchange asymmetry experiments, participants
in both treatment and control sessions were explicitly told that the chocolate “is
a gift. You own it. It is yours.” A possible criticism of Plott and Zeiler (2007)
is that some of their experimental treatments essentially removed the feeling of
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endowment. Given that the hypothesis of this paper was that a reduction in un-
certainty in preferences would eliminate exchange asymmetries often attributed to
the endowment effect, it was essential to ensure that participants felt endowed to
allow for a proper comparison of the two theories.
In the treatment sessions, the participants were given the option of tasting a
small amount of each variety of chocolate before making their decision. In the
control sessions, the participants were told that the “circle” variety chocolate was
described as “rich” and the “square” variety of chocolate was described as “luxu-
rious.” These descriptions were drawn directly from Ghiradelli’s advertising of the
two products and were given to the participants to provide a difference (albeit a
minor one) between the two varieties. The two scripts were otherwise identical.
Before making their trade decisions, participants were asked to complete a short
five minute survey (See Appendix B.3.) This survey was included to increase a
feeling of endowment by extending the time that participants had ownership over
their chocolate. The questions on the survey were modelled after a similar survey
used in Plott and Zeiler (2007), which includes many of the same questions. [40]
The surveys were not connected to the participants and provide no useful data for
this project. Once all participants had completed the survey, participants were
given a small piece of paper on which to make their trade decision (See Appendix
B.4). These trade decisions were made privately to avoid any possible contamina-
tion caused by public trades. Once the sessions concluded, each participant was
given a $10 show-up fee and participants traded their chocolate at the front of the
room, if they had chosen to do so on their trade sheet. Six exchange asymmetry
sessions were conducted between early 2017 and early 2018. Of the six conducted
exchange asymmetry sessions, half were treatment sessions and the other half were
control. The treatment sessions included 59 total participants, compared to 64
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participants in the control sessions.
The second set of experiments examined the effect of uncertainty in prefer-
ences on the WTA/WTP disparity. Participants were assigned random seats upon
entering the lab. Based on their seat number, half of the participants were en-
dowed with an unmarked bag of chocolate. Again, the assignment of chocolate
was randomized to ensure that participants did not interpret the assignment as
a signal of value and the bag was placed immediately in front of participants to
ensure that participants had a feeling of ownership over the chocolate. As in the
first set of experiments, participants given the chocolate were told that the bag
of chocolate was theirs, that it was a gift, and that they owned it. Again, this
wording was used to give the participants a feeling of ownership over their bag of
chocolate. Each bag contained half of a Ghiradelli “Milk Chocolate & Caramel”
bar, although the participants were not given this information. All participants
were also given a $5 show-up fee. The participants who were not given chocolate
were given an additional $5. Participants endowed with chocolate were unaware
of this additional payment and the un-endowed participants did not know that
the endowed participants were not given an extra $5. The extra payment was
needed to compensate the un-endowed participants, as the expected return from
purchasing assets in the next phase of the experiment was less than the expected
return from selling the assets. Once the participants had completed the consent
form, they read instructions on their computer (See Appendix B.5 for the complete
instructions.) The sessions consisted of three phases: an instruction and practice
period, an asset valuation period, and a chocolate period.
In the first period, the participants were taught to use a Becker-Degroot-
Marshak mechanism (BMD) to value assets with random returns. [3] The BDM is
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an incentive compatible mechanism for measuring an individual’s value for a good.
The BDM was chosen instead of alternate mechanisms used in other studies, many
of which are not incentive compatible, because it has been deemed the most theo-
retically incentive compatible mechanism by much of the literature. [39] To elicit
WTP values4, the mechanism functions as follows:
1. An individual is presented with a good available for purchase.
2. The individual submits a number which represents their willingness to pay
for that good.
3. A random number is drawn from an unknown distribution.5
4. If that random number exceeds the elicited WTP, the individual does not
purchase the good and keeps their money.
5. If the random number is less than the elicited WTP, the individual purchases
the good but pays only the random number, not their stated WTP.
Because no individual can impact the price they would pay for the good by chang-
ing their value, the optimal strategy is to reveal their true willingness to pay. For
example, suppose you are asked your willingness to pay for an asset which yields
$2.50 100% of the time. Your true WTP for this asset is $2.50. Suppose that
you submit a value less than $2.50. If the drawn random number is between your
stated value and $2.50, you would miss an opportunity to pay less than $2.50 for
an asset worth $2.50. If you submit a value greater than $2.50 and the random
draw is between your stated value and $2.50, you will purchase the asset for more
than it is worth and lose money. A similar argument can be made for submitting
4A BDM can also be used to elicit WTA values with obvious modifications to the mechanism.
5The distribution is unknown to prevent participants from anchoring on the bounds or mean
of the distribution. The distribution parameters do not affect the incentive compatibility of the
mechanism.
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willingness to accept values using a BDM. Individuals who were endowed with
chocolate were taught to use a BDM to elicit WTA values while individuals who
were not endowed with chocolate were taught to use a BDM which elicits WTP
values. Participants were directly told that revealing their true value is the optimal
strategy when using a BDM, and they were provided extensive examples and ex-
planations to substantiate that claim (See Appendix B.5.) Similar to the example
used above, participants were then asked to value a lottery which yields $2.50 100%
of the time. If participants stated a value other than $2.50, they were told that
they could have improved their expected profit by revealing their true value, with
an appropriate explanation dependent on their error. This training was included
to prevent subject misconceptions about the mechanism, as described by Plott and
Zeiler in their WTA/WTP disparity experiments [39]. This quiz was followed by a
practice round where the participants submitted values to either buy or sell an as-
set with random returns. Participants endowed with chocolate were asked for their
WTA to give up their asset while those without chocolate were asked their WTP
for the asset. No money changed hands in the practice round and the asset did
not yield real returns; the practice round simply provided additional preparation
for the subsequent rounds.
After the practice round had completed, the participants valued five assets
across five rounds. The parameter values for the assets were constant across indi-
viduals; that is, each participant submitted values for identical assets, regardless of
whether they were submitting values to buy or sell the asset. As noted above, the
participants without chocolate who were submitting WTP values were given an
additional $5 to account for the decreased expected return from purchasing rather
than selling the assets. After each participant submitted a value for the asset,
they were informed whether they bought/sold the asset, how much they paid/were
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paid, and whether the asset yielded a return. Participants were also given a run-
ning tally of their current earnings, including their show-up fee. Both the unpaid
practice round and the paid asset rounds were included in the experimental de-
sign to ensure that participants were familiar with the BDM before valuing the
chocolate in stage 3.
After the participants valued each of the lotteries, they were asked to value
a bag of chocolate using a BDM. Participants without chocolate were given an
additional $4 to account for possible income effects. In the treatment sessions,
participants were given a small piece of the chocolate to taste before making their
decisions. The instructions were otherwise identical across the two treatments.
After the participants submitted their values for the chocolate, they were told
whether they had bought/sold any chocolate, how much they paid/were paid, and
their final earnings for the experiment. Finally, to avoid any public contamination,
all of the individual results from the experiment were kept anonymous; participants
were paid privately at the front of the room, where they also received or gave
chocolate to the researcher, if applicable.
Four WTA/WTP disparity sessions were conducted in the first half of 2018.
Of the four sessions, two were treatment sessions where participants had the op-
portunity to taste the chocolate and two were the no-taste control. In total, 43
individuals participated in the control sessions and 34 individuals participated in
the treatment sessions.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Exchange Asymmetry Experiments
Table 2.1 provides the summary statistics for individuals who participated in
exchange asymmetry sessions. While very few trades occurred in the “low-
information” control sessions, almost exactly 50% of the participants in the “taste”
treatment sessions traded their chocolate for the alternate variety. Table 2.2 dis-
plays the results from two-sided exact binomial tests, where the null hypothesis is
that the true probability of trade equals 0.5 and the alternate hypothesis is that
the true probability does not equal 0.5. In the control sessions, we can easily reject
the null hypothesis at all commonly used significance levels, confirming the pres-
ence of an exchange asymmetry. In the “taste” treatment sessions, however, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis at any commonly used significance level. Thus,
we observe no exchange asymmetry in sessions with complete taste information.
The results in both sets of treatment sessions are consistent with the theoretical
predictions laid out in Section 2.3.
Table 2.3 provides the results for a two-sided difference in proportions test.
This test considers the null hypothesis that the true difference in the probability
of trade between the two groups is 0 against the alternative hypothesis that the
difference in the probability of trade between the two groups is non-zero. Once
again, the results are highly significant: the p-value allows us to reject the null
hypothesis for all commonly used significance levels.
Participants in the treatment sessions seemed to have a slight preference for
the “circle” variety chocolate, on average, with 55.9% of the participants leaving
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Table 2.1: Exchange Asymmetry: Summary Statistics and Results
Control Taste
Session 1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total
Sample Size 20 22 22 64 23 17 19 59
Square 10 11 11 32 11 9 9 29
Circle 10 11 11 32 12 8 10 30
Square Traded 0 1 1 2 6 5 5 16For Circle
Circle Traded 1 1 1 3 6 3 4 13For Square
Note: The above table contains the summary statistics for the exchange
asymmetry sessions. In the “taste” treatment sessions, participants were
allowed to sample both varieties of chocolate before making their trad-
ing decision. In the control sessions, participants were only told that the
“circle” variety of chocolate was described as “rich,” while the “square”
variety chocolate was described as luxurious. The “Square” row indicates
how many participants were randomly endowed with the “square” choco-
late and the “Circle” row indicates how many participants were randomly
endowed with the “circle” chocolate.
Table 2.2: Exchange Asymmetry: Binomial Test
Control Taste
Sample Size 64 59
Total Trades 5 29
Proportion Traded 0.078 0.492
Binomial Test p = 9*10−9 p = 1True Prob Trade , 0.5
95% CI (0.026, 0.173) (0.359, 0.625)
Note: The above table provides the results of two-sided exact
binomial tests. The null hypothesis is that the true probability
of trade = 0.5. The p-value from the binomial test for the
control group suggests that we can reject the null hypothesis
at all commonly used statistical significance levels. The p-
value from the binomial test for the “taste” treatment group,
however, cannot reject the null hypothesis at any commonly
used statistical significance level.
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Table 2.3: Exchange Asymmetry: Difference in Proportions
Control Taste
Sample Size 64 59
Total Trades 5 29
Proportion Traded 0.078 0.492
Diff in Prop p = 8.663*10−7
Note: The above table provides the re-
sults of a two-sided difference in propor-
tions test between the “taste” treatment
and the control. The resulting Pearson’s
chi-squared test statistic yields a p-value
= 8.663*10−7, suggesting a highly statisti-
cally significant difference in proportions.
the lab with the “circle” chocolate. However, 1) the preference is not statistically
significant6 and 2) the preferences of the population are irrelevant for measuring
exchange asymmetries, so long as half of the population is randomly endowed with
each variety.
2.5.2 WTA/WTP Disparity Experiments
Table 2.4 provides elicited values submitted by participants for the asset/lottery
valuation portion of the experiments. These rounds were not designed to yield
meaningful data for causal analysis, but instead provided the participants an op-
portunity to gain familiarity with the BDM. This data, however, may provide some
insight about the comparability of the participants in the treatment sessions and
the participants in the control sessions. Differences in mean WTA and WTP be-
tween treatments for a given asset were not statistically significant for any asset.
The WTA/WTP ratios were higher for most assets in the treatment sessions than
the control, but, if the participants in the treatment session did indeed have larger
6A two-sided exact binomial test, with a null hypothesis that the true probability of selecting
the “circle” variety chocolate = 0.5, yields a p-value = 0.435.
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WTA/WTP gaps for all goods, this would lead to attenuation bias in this setting,
as results would be biased towards the null hypothesis that uncertainty has no
impact on the WTA/WTP disparity.
Table 2.5 provides the individual chocolate valuations by session, treatment,
and endowment, and Figure 2.1 displays the responses in a box plot by treatment
and endowment. From the table, we can see that there is clearly substantial vari-
ation between sessions, but a WTA/WTP disparity is still visible in each session.
This is not surprising given the variance in participant valuations seen in Table
2.5. The box plot shows that the taste treatment reduces the variation in elicited
valuations and narrows the gap between WTA and WTP. Table 2.6 provides more
specifics. The “taste” treatment does indeed decrease the WTA/WTP disparity.
The elicited WTA of participants in the “taste” sessions was less than the elicited
WTA of participants in the control session, and, using a one-sided t-test, the dif-
ference was statistically significant at the 10% level. There was no statistically
significant difference in the elicited WTP between treatments, however. A one-
sided test is appropriate, in this case, as both the theory from Section 2.3 and
the literature suggests that decreases in uncertainty should close the WTA/WTP
disparity, not increase it.
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Table 2.6: WTA/WTP Disparity: Difference in Means
Taste Control Difference
WTA 2.40 3.52 -1.12*
(1.45) (2.9) (0.73)
WTP 1.12 1.08 0.03
(1.49) (1.45) (0.47)
WTA/WTP Ratio 2.14 3.26 N/A
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The above table provides mean elicited WTA
and WTP for the “taste” and control treatments, as well
as the difference in mean WTA and WTP between those
treatments. The first one-sided t-test was conducted
with a total sample of 37, 21 observations in the con-
trol group and 16 observations in the treatment group.
The second one-sided t-test was conducted with a total
sample of 40, 22 observations in the control group and
18 observations in the treatment group.
To check for the possible interference of income effects, we can compare total
earnings just before the participants made their chocolate valuations by endow-
ment and across treatments. On average, participants endowed with chocolate had
$10.66 before they submitted their WTA while participants who were not endowed
with chocolate had $14.11 before they submitted their WTP for the chocolate. This
difference is nearly identical between treatments, as well, with endowed individuals
having $3.39 more, on average, in the control sessions and $3.52 more, on average,
in the “taste” sessions. Given that the median valuation for the chocolate across all
participants was $1.5, the additional earnings should have prevented any income
effect from increasing the WTA/WTP disparity.
We can also check for a “House Money” effect, which hypothesizes that differ-
ences in earnings during the asset valuation phase of the experiment may impact
the participants’ stated values for chocolate. This paper uses the same test as Plott
and Zeiler (2005), regressing stated values on earnings immediately before partic-
ipants valued the chocolate. The estimated coefficients are given in Equations
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Figure 2.1: Box Plot of Chocolate Valuations by Treatment
(2.16) and (2.17) below.
WTAi = 4.317− 0.120 ∗ Ii
(t = 1.594) (t = −0.478)
(2.16)
WTPi = −0.826 + 0.137 ∗ Ii
(t = −0.330) (t = 0.177)
(2.17)
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where Ii represents individual i′s total earnings prior to submitting their value for
the chocolate using a BDM. The results of both regressions suggest that there is
no house money effect. That is, the results suggest that differences in earnings
during the asset valuation phase of the experiments had no impact on the values
submitted for chocolate. Indeed, both of the estimated coefficients on earnings
are close the zero and statistically insignificant at all commonly used significance
levels.
2.6 Discussion
The results from both sets of experiments suggest that uncertainty in preferences
may play a large role in the occurrence and magnitude of behavioral anomalies.
In the exchange asymmetry experiments, if the participants were given complete
information about their tastes, almost exactly 50% of trades occurred, while a large
exchange asymmetry was observed in the low information treatment. The design
of the experiment also controlled for other possible forms of uncertainty. First,
because the chocolate had been removed from its original packaging, it was not
possible for participants to learn the price of the chocolate after the experiment and
exchange it for money or an alternate variety. Second, most participants ate the
chocolate as soon as the experiment concluded, so there was minimal uncertainty
regarding the state of the world in which the chocolate would be consumed. Finally,
participants were told that all of the bags of chocolate contained the same weight
of chocolate, and thus there was no uncertainty regarding the quantity of chocolate
that they would be able to consume.
Transaction costs provide an alternate explanation for the large exchange asym-
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metries observed in the control sessions. When participants are nearly indifferent
between two goods, transaction costs may also contribute to a relative absence of
trades. [38] Given the minimal information given to participants in the control
sessions, this is a distinct possibility. A potentially fruitful area of future research
will examine the interaction between transaction costs and uncertainty. Indeed, it
seems plausible that the more uncertain individuals are about their preferences,
the larger transaction costs will loom in decision-making.
While the results from the WTA/WTP experiments also suggest that uncer-
tainty in preferences may play a role in the WTA/WTP disparity, the results are
less conclusive. First, while the observed disparity in the “taste” sessions does
see an economically significant decrease compared to the disparity observed in the
control sessions, the difference is less statically significant than the results from
the exchange asymmetry experiments. This is likely a function both of the relative
sample sizes between the two sets of experiments and the large variation in stated
values across participants in the WTA/WTP sessions. Second, while exchange
asymmetries disappear altogether in the first set of experiments, the WTA/WTP
disparity remains even for participants who received the “taste” treatment. An ob-
vious potential explanation for the persistence of the WTA/WTP disparity is the
continued influence of loss aversion or the endowment effect, even after controlling
for the influence of intrinsic uncertainty. That is, it is possible that uncertainty in
preferences is only one part of a larger set of factors which result in the behavioral
anomaly. Another possible explanation, however, is that the taste treatment in
the WTA/WTP experiments did not fully alleviate all uncertainty. The “taste”
treatment certainly reduced or eliminated the uncertainty regarding the utility
that the chocolate would provide, but the participants still had to translate that
utility into dollars using a BDM. If participants still had a “personal confidence
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interval” for their monetary valuation for the chocolate after the taste treatment,
it is possible the participants selected their WTA values from the upper end of that
interval and their WTP estimates from the lower end of the interval, as predicted
by Dubourg, Jones-Lee, and Loomes. [12] That is, it is possible that the “taste”
treatment reduced the size of that interval, but did not close the interval entirely,
resulting in a smaller but still statistically significant WTA/WTP disparity. Given
that the exchange asymmetry experiments 1) eliminated all uncertainty because
no money was involved in the trade, and 2) no behavioral anomaly was detected
once participants had complete certainty, this author finds the later explanation
for the persistence of the WTA/WTP disparity more compelling. Additional work
could examine uncertainty and exchange asymmetries when one of the two possible
goods is a randomly drawn quantity of money.
Given the recent work on experimental procedures and their influence on lab-
oratory results, the experiments in this paper were designed to control, as much
as possible, for confounding factors. Unlike previous work which shows that the
WTA/WTP disparity can be eliminated under certain experimental designs, this
paper finds a WTA/WTP disparity in all treatments and sessions. It is possible
that the persistence of the WTA/WTP disparity in both the “taste” and control
treatments, compared to the results of Plott and Zeiler (2005), is due to the em-
phasis placed on ownership and endowment given in the instructions. However,
the primary goal of this project was not to eliminate the WTA/WTP disparity,
but to show that uncertainty in preferences can explain a large portion of the
disparity in contexts where individuals are endowed with a good for which they
have uncertain preferences. Removing or diminishing the sense of endowment to
reduce the disparity would, therefore, have been counterproductive. The design of
the experiments was otherwise chosen to mimic the protocol with which Plott and
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Zeiler eliminated the disparity.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper explored the possibility that a significant portion of an important set
of behavioral anomalies could be explained by uncertainty in preferences using
laboratory experiments. Specifically, this paper used a “taste” treatment to exoge-
nously vary participants uncertainty and measure the impact of that variation on
the WTA/WTP disparity and exchange asymmetries. Participants in the “taste”
treatment sessions were allowed to taste small quantities of chocolate before either
valuing it or making trade decisions. In the first set of experiments, large ex-
change asymmetries were observed in control sessions where participants had very
little information about the chocolate they possessed and the alternate variety of
chocolate for which they could trade. This result conforms to much of the existing
literature on the behavioral anomaly. However, in the treatment sessions where
participants were allowed to taste both varieties of chocolate before trading, no
exchange asymmetries were observed.
The second set of experiments examined the effect of uncertainty in preferences
on the WTA/WTP disparity. Participants in both control and “taste’ sessions
used a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism to value a sequence of assets before
stating either their WTA or WTP for a bag of chocolate, depending on whether
they were randomly endowed with chocolate or not. Participants in the “taste”
session were allowed to taste a small amount of chocolate before stating their values.
While statistically significant disparities were observed in all sessions across both
treatments, the magnitude of the disparity was economically and statistically lower
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in the “taste” sessions than in the control.
Collectively, both sets of experiments suggest that uncertainty in preferences
plays a significant role in the occurrence and magnitude of observed behavioral
anomalies. Given the relative paucity of work dedicated to studying uncertain
preferences, this result is significant for behavioral and experimental economics,
and suggests that more work in this area is justified. The results also hold spe-
cial significance for environmental economics, where researchers have studied the
disparity between willingness to accept and willingness to pay for environmental
goods for which consumers often have highly uncertain preferences.
90
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Albert F Appleton. How New York City used an ecosystem services strategy
carried out through an urban-rural partnership to preserve the pristine quality
of its drinking water and save billions of dollars. In The Katoomba Conference,
2002.
[2] Simanti Banerjee, Anthony M Kwasnica, and James S Shortle. Agglomeration
bonus in small and large local networks: A laboratory examination of spatial
coordination. Ecological Economics, 84:142–152, 2012.
[3] Gordon M Becker, Morris H DeGroot, and Jacob Marschak. Measuring utility
by a single-response sequential method. Systems Research and Behavioral
Science, 9(3):226–232, 1964.
[4] Bernhard FJ Borges and Jack L Knetsch. Tests of market outcomes with
asymmetric valuations of gains and losses: Smaller gains, fewer trades, and
less value. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 33(2):185–193,
1998.
[5] John Bower and Derek Bunn. Experimental analysis of the efficiency of
uniform-price versus discriminatory auctions in the England and Wales elec-
tricity market. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 25(3):561–592,
2001.
[6] Peter C Boxall, Katherine Packman, Marian Weber, Antony Samarawickrema,
and W Yang. Price discovery mechanisms for providing ecological goods &
services from wetland restoration: An examination of reverse auctions. Eco-
logical Goods & Services Technical, page 191, 2009.
[7] Glenn Bush, Nick Hanley, Mirko Moro, and Daniel Rondeau. Measuring
the local costs of conservation: A provision point mechanism for eliciting
willingness to accept compensation. Land Economics, 89(3):490–513, 2013.
[8] Timothy N Cason and Lata Gangadharan. Auction design for voluntary con-
servation programs. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 86(5):1211–
1217, 2004.
[9] Don L Coursey, John L Hovis, and William D Schulze. The disparity between
willingness to accept and willingness to pay measures of value. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 102(3):679–690, 1987.
91
[10] James C Cox, Vernon L Smith, and James M Walker. Theory and behavior
of multiple unit discriminative auctions. The Journal of Finance, 39(4):983–
1010, 1984.
[11] Douglas D Davis and Charles A Holt. Experimental economics. Princeton
university press, 1993.
[12] W Richard Dubourg, Michael W Jones-Lee, and Graham Loomes. Impre-
cise preferences and the wtp-wta disparity. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
9(2):115–133, 1994.
[13] Nikolaos Georgantz´ıs and Daniel Navarro-Mart´ınez. Understanding the wta–
wtp gap: Attitudes, feelings, uncertainty and personality. Journal of Eco-
nomic Psychology, 31(6):895–907, 2010.
[14] Gautam Goswami, Thomas H Noe, and Michael J Rebello. Collusion in
uniform-price auctions: experimental evidence and implication for treasury
auctions. Review of Financial Studies, 9(3):757–785, 1996.
[15] Atakelty Hailu, Steven Schilizzi, and Sophie Thoyer. Assessing the perfor-
mance of auctions for the allocation of conservation contracts: Theoretical
and computational approaches. In Proceedings of the American Agricultural
Economics Association Annual Meeting, Providence, Rhode Island, 2005.
[16] W Michael Hanemann. Willingness to pay and willingness to accept: how
much can they differ? The American Economic Review, 81(3):635–647, 1991.
[17] Milton Harris and Artur Raviv. Allocation mechanisms and the design of
auctions. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 1477–
1499, 1981.
[18] Ori Heffetz and Moses Shayo. How large are non-budget-constraint effects
of prices on demand? American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
1(4):170–99, 2009.
[19] John K Horowitz and Kenneth E McConnell. A review of wta/wtp studies.
Journal of environmental economics and Management, 44(3):426–447, 2002.
[20] B Kelsey Jack. Allocation in environmental markets: A field experiment with
tree planting contracts. Technical report, Harvard Environmental Economics
Program, Cambridge, Mass., May 2010.
92
[21] B Kelsey Jack. Private information and the allocation of land use subsidies
in malawi. American Economic Journal. Applied Economics, 5(3):113, 2013.
[22] Eric J Johnson, Gerald Ha¨ubl, and Anat Keinan. Aspects of endowment:
a query theory of value construction. Journal of experimental psychology:
Learning, memory, and cognition, 33(3):461, 2007.
[23] Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision
under risk. Econometrica, 47(2):263–292, 1979.
[24] Younjun Kim, Catherine L Kling, and Jinhua Zhao. Understanding behavioral
explanations of the wtp-wta divergence through a neoclassical lens: implica-
tions for environmental policy. Annu. Rev. Resour. Econ., 7(1):169–187, 2015.
[25] Botond Ko˝szegi and Matthew Rabin. A model of reference-dependent prefer-
ences. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(4):1133–1165, 2006.
[26] Laure Kuhfuss, Raphae¨le Pre´get, Sophie Thoyer, and Nick Hanley. Nudging
farmers to enrol land into agri-environmental schemes: the role of a collective
bonus. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 43(4):609–636, 2016.
[27] Uwe Latacz-Lohmann and Steven Schilizzi. Auctions for conservation con-
tracts: a review of the theoretical and empirical literature. Report to the
Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department, 15, 2005.
[28] Uwe Latacz-Lohmann and Carel Van der Hamsvoort. Auctioning conservation
contracts: a theoretical analysis and an application. American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, 79(2):407–418, 1997.
[29] Philippe Le Coent, Raphae¨le Pre´get, Sophie Thoyer, et al. Why pay for
nothing? an experiment on a conditional subsidy scheme in a threshold public
good game. Economics Bulletin, 34(3):1976–1989, 2014.
[30] John A List. Preference reversals of a different kind: The” more is less”
phenomenon. American Economic Review, 92(5):1636–1643, 2002.
[31] John A List. Does market experience eliminate market anomalies? The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1):41–71, 2003.
[32] Graham Loomes, Shepley Orr, and Robert Sugden. Taste uncertainty and
status quo effects in consumer choice. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
39(2):113–135, 2009.
93
[33] Melanie Marks and Rachel Croson. Alternative rebate rules in the provision
of a threshold public good: An experimental investigation. Journal of Public
Economics, 67(2):195–220, 1998.
[34] Kent D Messer, Joshua M Duke, Lori Lynch, and Tongzhe Li. When does pub-
lic information undermine the efficiency of reverse auctions for the purchase
of ecosystem services? Ecological Economics, 134:212–226, 2017.
[35] Roger B Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Re-
search, 6(1):58–73, 1981.
[36] Dieter Nautz. Optimal bidding in multi-unit auctions with many bidders.
Economics Letters, 48(3):301–306, 1995.
[37] Gregory M Parkhurst, Jason F Shogren, Chris Bastian, Paul Kivi, Jennifer
Donner, and Rodney BW Smith. Agglomeration bonus: an incentive mech-
anism to reunite fragmented habitat for biodiversity conservation. Ecological
Economics, 41(2):305–328, 2002.
[38] Charles R Plott and Vernon L Smith. An experimental examination of two
exchange institutions. The Review of economic studies, 45(1):133–153, 1978.
[39] Charles R Plott and Kathryn Zeiler. The willingness to pay-willingness to
accept gap, the” endowment effect,” subject misconceptions, and experimental
procedures for eliciting valuations. American Economic Review, 95(3):530–
545, 2005.
[40] Charles R Plott and Kathryn Zeiler. Exchange asymmetries incorrectly inter-
preted as evidence of endowment effect theory and prospect theory? American
Economic Review, 97(4):1449–1466, 2007.
[41] John G Riley and William F Samuelson. Optimal auctions. The American
Economic Review, 71(3):381–392, 1981.
[42] Daniel Rondeau, Gregory L Poe, and William D Schulze. VCM or PPM? A
comparison of the performance of two voluntary public goods mechanisms.
Journal of Public Economics, 89(8):1581–1592, 2005.
[43] Daniel Rondeau, William D Schulze, and Gregory L Poe. Voluntary revelation
of the demand for public goods using a provision point mechanism. Journal
of Public Economics, 72(3):455–470, 1999.
94
[44] Sahotra Sarkar, Robert L Pressey, Daniel P Faith, Christopher R Margules,
Trevon Fuller, David M Stoms, Alexander Moffett, Kerrie A Wilson, Kristen J
Williams, Paul H Williams, et al. Biodiversity conservation planning tools:
present status and challenges for the future. Annual Review of Environment
and Resources, 31, 2006.
[45] Leonard J Savage. The foundations of statistics. Courier Corporation, 1972.
[46] Steven Schilizzi and Uwe Latacz-Lohmann. Assessing the performance of
conservation auctions: an experimental study. Land Economics, 83(4):497–
515, 2007.
[47] David Schmeidler and Itzhak Gilboa. Maxmin expected utility with non-
unique prior. In Uncertainty in Economic Theory, pages 141–151. Routledge,
2004.
[48] Robert Sugden. Reference-dependent subjective expected utility. Journal of
economic theory, 111(2):172–191, 2003.
[49] William Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed ten-
ders. The Journal of Finance, 16(1):8–37, 1961.
[50] William Vickrey. Auctions and bidding games. Recent Advances in Game
Theory, 29:15–27, 1962.
[51] Travis Warziniack, Jason F Shogren, and Gregory Parkhurst. Creating con-
tiguous forest habitat: An experimental examination on incentives and com-
munication. Journal of Forest Economics, 13(2-3):191–207, 2007.
[52] Elmar Wolfstetter. Auctions: an introduction. Journal of Economic Surveys,
10(4):367–420, 1996.
[53] Jinhua Zhao and Catherine L Kling. A new explanation for the wtp/wta
disparity. Economics Letters, 73(3):293–300, 2001.
[54] Jinhua Zhao and Catherine L Kling. Willingness to pay, compensating varia-
tion, and the cost of commitment. Economic Inquiry, 42(3):503–517, 2004.
95
APPENDIX A
PROVISION POINT REVERSE AUCTION - APPENDIX
A.1 Multiunit Reverse Discriminative Auction Symmetric
Optimal Offer Function
I confirm the symmetric Bayseian Nash equilibrium found by Hailu, Schilizzi and
Thoyer (2005). In a multiunit reverse auction (also known as a target-constrained
auction), a participant in the auction is interested in the probability that their offer
will be one of the p lowest offers out of the n offers submitted by the n participants.
This probability is represented by g(O−1j (oi)) in (1.5). The expected profit for an
individual in this auction is then represented by
E[Π] = (oi − vi)× g(O−1j (oi)) (A.1)
which is a more specific representation of (1.4). The first order conditions to
maximize (A.1) are
g(O−1j (oi)) + (oi − vi)
∂g(O−1j (oi)
∂oi
∂O−1j (oi)
∂oi
= 0 (A.2)
Recalling that
∂f−1(x)
∂x
= 1
f ′(f−1(x) (A.3)
Equation (A.2) simplifies to
g(O−1j (oi)) + (oi − vi)
∂g(O−1j (oi)
∂oi
∂Oj(O−1j (oi))
∂oi
= 0 (A.4)
In equilibrium, oi = Oj(vi) = O∗i,TC(vi). Equation (A.4) becomes
vi
∂g(vi)
∂oi
= g(vi)
∂O∗i,TC(vi)
∂oi
+O∗i,TC(vi)
∂g(vi)
∂oi
(A.5)
96
Integrating both sides of (A.5) with respect to oi yields
−
∫ 1
vi
u
∂g(u)
∂oi
du = O∗i,TC(vi)g(vi) (A.6)
Dividing both sides by g(vi) and noting that g(1) = 0, we have
O∗i,TC(vi) =
− ∫ 1vi u∂g(u)∂oi du
− ∫ 1vi ∂g(u)∂oi du (A.7)
Given that, according to (1.5),
∂g(u)
∂oi
= (n− 1)!(p− 1)!(n− p− 1)!u
p−1(1− u)n−p−1 (A.8)
the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the multiunit reverse discriminative
auction is given by
O∗i,TC(vi) =
∫ 1
vi
up(1− u)n−p−1du∫ 1
vi
up−1(1− u)n−p−1du (A.9)
A.2 Instructions: Target-Constrained Auction
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 
This experiment is a study of individual decision-making in a group setting. If you follow 
these instructions carefully and make informed decisions, you will earn money. The 
money you earn will be paid to you, in cash, after the experiment has concluded. We ask 
that you do not use any electronic devices during this experiment, including cell phones, 
tablets, etc. We further ask that you do not communicate with your peers in any capacity. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the researchers will come to assist 
you. 
 
In this experiment, you are a member of a group consisting of eight individuals. You and 
the other seven individuals each own one unit of a good that can be rented out each 
round. Each unit of the good is indistinguishable from any of the other units owned by 
your fellow participants. Additionally, each participant in your group will be given an 
individual valuation for their own unit of the good, which we will call their opportunity 
cost (more details will follow). Individuals who do not rent out their unit will receive 
this opportunity cost as payment at the end of each round. A single buyer is interested in 
renting five units of the good each round. (The buyer is not interested in renting more 
than five units) The buyer will pay individuals for their units using an auction. The 
auction will be conducted as follows: 
 Each round, you will submit an offer representing the amount of money for which 
you would be willing to rent out your unit during that round. (Your offers will be 
capped at $7 each round. If you try to submit an offer higher than $7, you will be 
asked to enter a different offer.) 
 Your peers will also submit their own offers for their units. 
 The buyer will then rank these offers in ascending order and provide contracts to 
the lowest offer, then the second lowest offer, and so on until the fifth lowest 
offer. 
 If you do receive a contract from the buyer, the buyer will take your unit (for that 
round) and you will receive your offer as payment (for that round). 
 If you do not receive a contract from the buyer, you will keep your unit and 
receive your opportunity cost as payment for that round. 
 
An individual’s opportunity cost (in experimental dollars) will be drawn from a uniform 
distribution from 0 to 2, in increments of 0.01. In other words, you will randomly 
receive a number between 0 and 2, where each number is equally likely to be drawn.  For 
example, the odds that you receive opportunity cost = 1.15 are the same as the odds that 
you receive opportunity cost = 0.82 are the same as the odds that you receive opportunity 
cost = 0.23, etc. As such, each of the eight individuals in your group will be randomly 
assigned an opportunity cost and will formulate offers given this information. All 
individuals in your group know only their own opportunity costs and that the other 
individuals in their group have opportunity costs drawn from the same distribution. 
You will not know the opportunity costs of any of your peers. 
 
After eight rounds, you will be randomly assigned to a new group of eight individuals. 
(The random assignments were made before this session by drawing numbers from a hat. 
The assignment will not be based on the offers made in previous rounds.) In addition, you 
will receive a new opportunity cost, drawn from the same distribution as before. Each of 
the other 23 participants in this room will also be randomly assigned to a new group of 
eight individuals, and will also draw new opportunity costs. If there are any questions 
about this process, please raise your hand and ask one of the researchers. 
 
The experiment will be complete after 16 rounds. All experimental dollars will be 
converted to real dollars using a one-to-one ratio. Before the experiment begins, the 
researcher will briefly discuss the experiment with you using a PowerPoint presentation. 
There will also be five practice rounds where all 24 participants will participate in rounds 
of the auction. After these rounds, new opportunity costs and groups will be assigned, 
and the experiment will begin. 
Summary 
 At the beginning of the experiment, you will receive a randomly drawn 
opportunity cost between 0 and 2, with each value in that range being equally 
likely. 
 Based on that opportunity cost, each round you will submit an offer to the buyer 
for your unit. 
 For each round, if out of your group of eight, your offer is one of the five lowest 
offers, you will receive your offer as payment. 
 For additional clarification: in order to receive your offer as payment instead of 
your opportunity cost, your offer must be accepted by the buyer. For your offer to 
be accepted, your offer must be one of the five lowest. If your offer is not one of 
the five lowest offers, you will receive your opportunity cost as payment. 
 After each round, you will once again have possession of your unit, and will be 
able to participate in the auction during the next round. 
 After eight rounds, you and the other 23 participants in the experiment will be 
randomly assigned to new groups of eight with new, randomly assigned 
opportunity costs. You will maintain these new groups and opportunity costs for 
the remaining 8 rounds. 
 
A.3 Power Point: Target-Constrained Auction
Overview of Experiment
▪Throughout this experiment you own one unit of an asset that you can either use yourself or 
rent out each round. If you keep the unit in a round you can use it yourself for a value which we 
call your opportunity cost. So, if you don't rent the unit you will be paid your opportunity cost by 
the experimenter for that round. If you do rent your unit you can not use it but will instead be 
paid a rent determined in an auction. In order for your unit to be rented, your offer must be one 
of the three lowest offers submitted by your group.
▪Regardless of whether your unit was rented or not, at the beginning of every round, you will 
once again have possession of your unit, and will submit another offer for the opportunity to 
rent it.
• You have been randomly assigned to a group of 8 individuals.
• At the beginning of the experiment, you will receive a randomly drawn opportunity cost 
between 0 and 2, with each value in that range being equally likely.
• You will receive a new randomly assigned opportunity cost after 8 rounds.
• The groups will also be randomly reassigned after 8 rounds.
• Based on your opportunity cost, each round you will submit an offer to the buyer for your unit.
• In a given round, if you receive a contract, you will rent out your unit and receive your offer as 
payment for that round. (You will earn your offer instead of your opportunity cost as payment.)
• If you do not receive a contract, you will keep your unit and earn your opportunity cost as payment 
for that round.
Overview of Instructions
100
Overview of Instructions
• There will be five practice rounds, the results of which will not result in monetary rewards. These 
rounds are merely for instruction.
• Across these five rounds, the funding threshold will change. The goal of these rounds is simply to 
detail how the software functions and to ensure that all participants fully understand how the 
auction works.
• After the five practice rounds, the funding threshold will be fixed at 3, respectively, for all 16 rounds. 
These rounds will result in monetary rewards at the end of the experiment.
Your offer will 
go in the 
yellow box.
Your payment will 
appear here, after 
updating
Click the submit 
button once you have 
decided on an offer.
A.4 Instructions: Budget-Constrained Auction
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 
This experiment is a study of individual decision-making in a group setting. If you follow 
these instructions carefully and make informed decisions, you will earn money. The 
money you earn will be paid to you, in cash, after the experiment has concluded. We ask 
that you do not use any electronic devices during this experiment, including cell phones, 
tablets, etc. We further ask that you do not communicate with your peers in any capacity. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the researchers will come to assist 
you. 
 
In this experiment, you are a member of a group consisting of eight individuals. You and 
the other seven individuals each own one unit of a good that can be rented out each 
round. Each unit of the good is indistinguishable from any of the other units owned by 
your fellow participants. Additionally, each participant in your group will be given an 
individual valuation for their own unit of the good, which we will call their opportunity 
cost (more details will follow). Individuals who do not rent out their unit will receive 
this opportunity cost as payment at the end of each round. A single buyer is interested in 
renting units of the good each round. However, the buyer has a limited budget and thus 
will pay individuals for their units using an auction. The auction will be conducted as 
follows: 
 Each round, you will submit an offer representing the amount of money for which 
you would be willing to rent out your unit during that round. (Your offers will be 
capped at $7 each round. If you try to submit an offer higher than $7, you will be 
asked to enter a different offer.) 
 Your peers will also submit their own offers for their units. 
 The buyer will then rank these offers in ascending order and provide contracts to 
the lowest offer, then the second lowest offer, and so on until the buyer’s budget 
is exhausted. 
 If you do receive a contract from the buyer, the buyer will take your unit (for that 
round) and you will receive your offer as payment (for that round). 
 If you do not receive a contract from the buyer, you will keep your unit and 
receive your opportunity cost as payment for that round. 
  
An individual’s opportunity cost (in experimental dollars) will be drawn from a uniform 
distribution from 0 to 2, in increments of 0.01. In other words, you will randomly 
receive a number between 0 and 2, where each number is equally likely to be drawn.  For 
example, the odds that you receive opportunity cost = 1.15 are the same as the odds that 
you receive opportunity cost = 0.82 are the same as the odds that you receive opportunity 
cost = 0.23, etc. As such, each of the eight individuals in your group will be randomly 
assigned an opportunity cost and will formulate offers given this information. All 
individuals in your group know only their own opportunity costs and that the other 
individuals in their group have opportunity costs drawn from the same distribution. 
You will not know the opportunity costs of any of your peers. 
 
After eight rounds, you will be randomly assigned to a new group of eight individuals. 
(The random assignments were made before this session by drawing numbers from a hat. 
The assignment will not be based on the offers made in previous rounds.) In addition, you 
will receive a new opportunity cost, drawn from the same distribution as before. Each of 
the other 23 participants in this room will also be randomly assigned to a new group of 
eight individuals, and will also draw new opportunity costs. This process will occur every 
eight rounds. If there are any questions about this process, please raise your hand and ask 
one of the researchers. 
 
The experiment will be complete after 16 rounds. All experimental dollars will be 
converted to real dollars using a one-to-one ratio. Before the experiment begins, the 
researcher will briefly discuss the experiment with you using a PowerPoint presentation. 
There will also be five practice rounds where all 24 participants will participate in rounds 
of the auction. After these rounds, new opportunity costs and groups will be assigned, 
and the experiment will begin. 
Summary 
 At the beginning of the experiment, you will receive a randomly drawn 
opportunity cost between 0 and 2, with each value in that range being equally 
likely. 
 Based on that opportunity cost, each round you will submit an offer to the buyer 
for your unit. 
 The buyer has a budget, $4.42, with which to award contracts. The buyer accepts 
offers in ascending order, from smallest to largest until their budget is exhausted. 
 In a given round, if you receive a contract, you will rent out your unit and receive 
your offer as payment for that round. (You will earn your offer instead of your 
opportunity cost as payment.) 
 If you do not receive a contract, you will keep your unit and earn your opportunity 
cost as payment for that round. 
 After each round, you will once again have possession of your unit, and will be 
able to participate in the auction during the next round. 
 After eight rounds, you and the other 23 participants in the experiment will be 
randomly assigned to new groups of eight with new, randomly assigned 
opportunity costs. The budget will remain constant across all 16 rounds. 
 
A.5 Power Point: Budget-Constrained Auction
Overview of Experiment
▪Throughout this experiment you own one unit of an asset that you can either use yourself or 
rent out each round. If you keep the unit in a round you can use it yourself for a value which we 
call your opportunity cost. So, if you don't rent the unit you will be paid your opportunity cost by 
the experimenter for that round. If you do rent your unit you can not use it but will instead be 
paid a rent determined in an auction. In order for your unit to be rented, your offer must be one 
of the cheapest offers, until the budget is exhausted.
▪Regardless of whether your unit was rented or not, at the beginning of every round, you will 
once again have possession of your unit, and will submit another offer for the opportunity to 
rent it.
• You have been randomly assigned to a group of 8 individuals.
• At the beginning of the experiment, you will receive a randomly drawn opportunity cost 
between 0 and 2, with each value in that range being equally likely.
• You will receive a new randomly assigned opportunity cost after 8 rounds.
• The groups will also be randomly reassigned after 8 rounds.
• Based on your opportunity cost, each round you will submit an offer to the buyer for your unit.
• In a given round, if you receive a contract, you will rent out your unit and receive your offer as 
payment for that round. (You will earn your offer instead of your opportunity cost as payment.)
• If you do not receive a contract, you will keep your unit and earn your opportunity cost as payment 
for that round.
Overview of Instructions
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Overview of Instructions
• The buyer has a limited budget of $4.42. The buyer will accept offers in ascending order until their 
budget is exhausted.
• There will be five practice rounds, the results of which will not result in monetary rewards. These 
rounds are merely for instruction.
• Across these five rounds, the budget will change. The goal of these rounds is simply to detail how 
the software functions and to ensure that all participants fully understand how the auction works.
• After the five practice rounds, the budget will be fixed at $4.42 for all 16 rounds. These rounds will 
result in monetary rewards at the end of the experiment.
Your offer will 
go in the 
yellow box.
Your payment will 
appear here, after 
updating
Click the submit 
button once you have 
decided on an offer.
A.6 Instructions: Provision Point Reverse Auction
105
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
This experiment is a study of individual decision-making in a group setting. If you follow 
these instructions carefully and make informed decisions, you will earn money. The 
money you earn will be paid to you, in cash, after the experiment has concluded. We ask 
that you do not use any electronic devices during this experiment, including cell phones, 
tablets, etc. We further ask that you do not communicate with your peers in any capacity. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the researchers will come to assist 
you. 
 
In this experiment, you are a member of a group consisting of eight individuals. You and 
the other seven individuals each own one unit of a good that can be rented out each 
round. Each unit of the good is indistinguishable from any of the other units owned by 
your fellow participants. Additionally, each participant in your group will be given an 
individual valuation for their own unit of the good, which we will call their opportunity 
cost (more details will follow). Individuals who do not rent out their unit will receive 
this opportunity cost as payment at the end of each round. A single buyer is interested in 
renting five units of the good each round. (The buyer is not interested in renting more 
than five units) However, the buyer has a limited budget and thus will pay individuals for 
their units using an auction. The auction will be conducted as follows: 
 Each round, you will submit an offer representing the amount of money for which 
you would be willing to rent out your unit during that round. (Your offers will be 
capped at $7 each round. If you try to submit an offer higher than $7, you will be 
asked to enter a different offer.) 
 Your peers will also submit their own offers for their units. 
 The buyer will then rank these offers in ascending order and provide contracts to 
the lowest offer, then the second lowest offer, and so on until the fifth lowest 
offer. 
 If you do receive a contract from the buyer, the buyer will take your unit (for that 
round) and you will receive your offer as payment (for that round). 
 If you do not receive a contract from the buyer, you will keep your unit and 
receive your opportunity cost as payment for that round. 
  
However, the buyer is only interested in offering contracts to individuals in your group if 
they can afford at least five of the offers. From this point on, this number (five) will be 
referred to as the funding threshold. If, given the offers that your group submits, the 
buyer cannot afford the five lowest offers, then no individual will receive a contract, 
regardless of the magnitude of their offer. If the buyer can afford at least five offers then 
the buyer will offer contracts to the participants that submitted the five lowest offers, as 
described above.  
 
An individual’s opportunity cost (in experimental dollars) will be drawn from a uniform 
distribution from 0 to 2, in increments of 0.01. In other words, you will randomly 
receive a number between 0 and 2, where each number is equally likely to be drawn.  For 
example, the odds that you receive opportunity cost = 1.15 are the same as the odds that 
you receive opportunity cost = 0.82 are the same as the odds that you receive opportunity 
cost = 0.23, etc. As such, each of the eight individuals in your group will be randomly 
assigned an opportunity cost and will formulate offers given this information. All 
individuals in your group know only their own opportunity costs and that the other 
individuals in their group have opportunity costs drawn from the same distribution. 
You will not know the opportunity costs of any of your peers. 
 
After eight rounds, you will be randomly assigned to a new group of eight individuals. 
(The random assignments were made before this session by drawing numbers from a hat. 
The assignment will not be based on the offers made in previous rounds.) In addition, you 
will receive a new opportunity cost, drawn from the same distribution as before. Each of 
the other 23 participants in this room will also be randomly assigned to a new group of 
eight individuals, and will also draw new opportunity costs. This process will occur every 
eight rounds. If there are any questions about this process, please raise your hand and ask 
one of the researchers. 
 
The experiment will be complete after 16 rounds. All experimental dollars will be 
converted to real dollars using a one-to-one ratio. Before the experiment begins, the 
researcher will briefly discuss the experiment with you using a PowerPoint presentation. 
There will also be five practice rounds where all 24 participants will participate in rounds 
of the auction. After these rounds, new opportunity costs and groups will be assigned, 
and the experiment will begin. 
Summary 
 At the beginning of the experiment, you will receive a randomly drawn 
opportunity cost between 0 and 2, with each value in that range being equally 
likely. 
 Based on that opportunity cost, each round you will submit an offer to the buyer 
for your unit. 
 The buyer has a budget, $4.42, with which to award contracts. The buyer accepts 
offers in ascending order, from smallest to largest. 
 For each round, if out of your group of eight, the buyer cannot afford the lowest 
five offers, then no contracts will be awarded. If the buyer can afford the five 
lowest offers, then exactly five contracts will be made with the participants who 
submitted the five lowest offers. 
 In a given round, if you receive a contract, you will rent out your unit and receive 
your offer as payment for that round. (You will earn your offer instead of your 
opportunity cost as payment.) 
 If you do not receive a contract, you will keep your unit and earn your opportunity 
cost as payment for that round. 
 For additional clarification: in order to receive your offer as payment instead of 
your opportunity cost, your offer must be accepted by the buyer. For your offer to 
be accepted, your offer must be one of the five lowest, and the sum of the five 
lowest offers must be less than the buyer’s budget. If those two conditions are not 
met, you will receive your opportunity cost as payment. 
 After each round, you will once again have possession of your unit, and will be 
able to participate in the auction during the next round. 
 After eight rounds, you and the other 23 participants in the experiment will be 
randomly assigned to new groups of eight with new, randomly assigned 
opportunity costs. The budget and funding threshold will remain constant across 
all 16 rounds. 
 
A.7 Power Point: Provision Point Reverse Auction
Overview of Experiment
▪Throughout this experiment you own one unit of an asset that you can either use yourself or 
rent out each round. If you keep the unit in a round you can use it yourself for a value which we 
call your opportunity cost. So, if you don't rent the unit you will be paid your opportunity cost by 
the experimenter for that round. If you do rent your unit you can not use it but will instead be 
paid a rent determined in an auction. In order for your unit to be rented, there are two 
requirements:
▪ 1. Your offer must be one of the five lowest offers submitted by your group.
▪ 2. The total of the five lowest offers in your group must be less than the experimenter’s budget.
▪Regardless of whether your unit was rented or not, at the beginning of every round, you will 
once again have possession of your unit, and will submit another offer for the opportunity to 
rent it.
• You have been randomly assigned to a group of 8 individuals.
• At the beginning of the experiment, you will receive a randomly drawn opportunity cost 
between 0 and 2, with each value in that range being equally likely.
• You will receive a new randomly assigned opportunity cost every 8 rounds.
• The groups will also be randomly reassigned after 8 rounds.
• Based on your opportunity cost, each round you will submit an offer to the buyer for your unit.
• For each round, if out of your group of eight, the buyer cannot afford the lowest five offers, 
then no contracts will be awarded. If the buyer can afford the five lowest offers, then exactly 
five contracts will be made with the participants who submitted the five lowest offers.
Overview of Instructions
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• In a given round, if you receive a contract, you will rent out your unit and receive your offer as 
payment for that round. (You will earn your offer instead of your opportunity cost as payment.)
• If you do not receive a contract, you will keep your unit and earn your opportunity cost as payment 
for that round.
• For additional clarification: in order to receive your offer as payment instead of your opportunity 
cost, your offer must be accepted by the buyer. For your offer to be accepted, your offer must be 
one of the five lowest, and the sum of the five lowest offers must be less than the buyer’s budget. If 
those two conditions are not met, you will receive your opportunity cost as payment.
• After each round, you will once again have possession of your unit, and will be able to participate in 
the auction during the next round.
Overview of Instructions
Overview of Instructions
• There will be five practice rounds, the results of which will not result in monetary rewards. These 
rounds are merely for instruction.
• Across these five rounds, the funding threshold and budget will change. The goal of these rounds is 
simply to detail how the software functions and to ensure that all participants fully understand how 
the auction works.
• After the five practice rounds, the budget and funding threshold will be fixed at $4.42 and 5, 
respectively, for all 16 rounds. These rounds will result in monetary rewards at the end of the 
experiment.
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Put offer here.
Click submit button 
when offer has been 
input to yellow box.
Click the update 
button when 
instructed, after 
your offer has 
been submitted.
At the end of the experiment, you total 
earnings should appear here.
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APPENDIX B
UNCERTAINTY IN PREFERENCES
B.1 Chocolate Bags
The following are pictures of the “circle” and “square” variety chocolates partici-
pants were given in the exchange asymmetry experiments.
Figure B.1: Bag of “Circle” Variety Chocolate
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Figure B.2: Bag of “Square” Variety Chocolate
B.2 Exchange Asymmetry Scripts
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TREATMENT SCRIPT 
 
The following is the script the researcher will read during treatment sessions, and once all 
the participants have signed their consent forms. There will be no written instructions. 
 
“This experiment is a study of individual decision-making under uncertainty. We ask that 
you do not use any electronic devices during this experiment, including cell phones, 
tablets, etc. We further ask that you do not communicate with your peers in any capacity. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the researcher will come to assist 
you.” 
 
The researcher will distribute the chocolate now. 
 
“You have been randomly given one of two varieties of chocolate. It is a gift. You own it. 
It is yours. I ask that you do not open the bag or consume the chocolate in the bag until 
the experiment has completed. Both circle and square variety bags contain the same 
weight of chocolate. Both varieties of chocolate are produced by the same company. On 
the desk in front of you, there is a short survey. Please complete this survey now.” 
 
The researcher will wait until the participants have completed the survey. Once all 
participants have completed the survey, the researcher will collect them. 
 
“Thank you for completing the survey. Before the experiment concludes, you have the 
option of trading your bag of chocolate for the alternate variety. Before you make your 
decision, you will have the opportunity to taste a small amount of each variety. In the 
small bags on your desk, you will find two pieces of chocolate, one labeled ‘square’ and 
one labeled ‘circle.’ Feel free to try each variety now.” 
 
The researcher will wait until the participants have tried both pieces of chocolate. 
 
“Thank you for participating in this experiment. If you would like to trade your 
chocolate, you may do so when you approach the front of the room to collect your show-
up fee.” 
CONTROL SCRIPT “DESCRIPTIONS” 
 
The following is the script the researcher will read during control sessions, and once all 
the participants have signed their consent forms. There will be no written instructions. 
 
“This experiment is a study of individual decision-making under uncertainty. We ask that 
you do not use any electronic devices during this experiment, including cell phones, 
tablets, etc. We further ask that you do not communicate with your peers in any capacity. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the researcher will come to assist 
you.” 
 
The researcher will distribute the chocolate now. 
 
“You have been randomly given one of two varieties of chocolate. It is a gift. You own it. 
It is yours. I ask that you do not open the bag or consume the chocolate in the bag until 
the experiment has completed. The “square” variety of chocolate has been described as 
“luxurious”, while the circle variety of chocolate has been described as “rich.” Both 
circle and square variety bags contain the same weight of chocolate. Both varieties of 
chocolate are produced by the same company. On the desk in front of you, there is a short 
survey. Please complete this survey now.” 
 
The researcher will wait until the participants have completed the survey. Once all 
participants have completed the survey, the researcher will collect them. 
 
“Thank you for completing the survey. Before the experiment concludes, you have the 
option of trading your bag of chocolate for the alternate variety. You may do so when 
you approach the front of the room to collect your show-up fee.” 
B.3 Exchange Asymmetry Survey
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Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability. 
1. The current United States Secretary of State is _______________________. 
How likely is it that your answer is correct? ____________________ percent. 
(enter likelihood between 0 and 100 percent) 
2. Bucharest is the capital city of ____________________________________. 
How likely is it that your answer is correct? ____________________ percent. 
(enter likelihood between 0 and 100 percent) 
3. The author of the novel The Phantom of the Opera is __________________. 
How likely is it that your answer is correct? ____________________ percent. 
(enter likelihood between 0 and 100 percent) 
4. The actor _______________ plays the Wolverine in the X-Men movie franchise. 
How likely is it that your answer is correct? ____________________ percent. 
(enter likelihood between 0 and 100 percent) 
5. What does the acronym NASA stand for? ____________________________. 
How likely is it that your answer is correct? ____________________ percent. 
(enter likelihood between 0 and 100 percent) 
6. Montgomery is the capital of the state _______________________________. 
How likely is it that your answer is correct? ____________________ percent. 
(enter likelihood between 0 and 100 percent) 
7. The car company Volvo has its headquarters in the country ______________. 
How likely is it that your answer is correct? ____________________ percent. 
(enter likelihood between 0 and 100 percent) 
8. The square root of 729 is _________________________________________. 
How likely is it that your answer is correct? ____________________ percent. 
(enter likelihood between 0 and 100 percent) 
B.4 Exchange Asymmetry Trade Sheet
The following is a picture of the small piece of paper participants used to make
their trade decisions.
Figure B.3: Exchange Asymmetry Trade Sheet
B.5 WTA/WTP Disparity Instructions: Treatment
The following are the instructions, page by page and as they would have appeared
on a computer monitor, for a participant not endowed with chocolate who incor-
rectly answered the quiz question and submitted a value = 1.6 for the practice
asset.
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